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JUST TRANSITIONS
ANN M. EISENBERG*
The transition to a low-carbon society will have winners and losers as
the costs and benefits of decarbonization fall unevenly on different
communities. This potential collateral damage has prompted calls for a “just
transition” to a green economy. While the term, “just transition,” is
increasingly prevalent in the public discourse, it remains under-discussed
and poorly defined in legal literature, preventing it from helping catalyze
fair decarbonization. This Article seeks to define the term, test its validity,
and articulate its relationship with law so the idea can meet its potential.
The Article is the first to disambiguate and assess two main rhetorical
usages of “just transition.” I argue that legal scholars should recognize it
as a term of art that evolved in the labor movement, first known as a
“superfund for workers.” In the climate change context, I therefore define a
just transition as the principle of easing the burden decarbonization poses
to those who depend on high-carbon industries. This definition provides
clarity and can help law engage with fields that already recognize just
transitions as a labor concept.
I argue further that the labor-driven just transition concept is both
justified and essential in light of today’s deep political polarization and
“jobs-versus-environment” tensions. First, it can incorporate much-needed
economic equity considerations into environmental decisionmaking. Second,
it can inform a modernized alternative to the environmental law apparatus,
which must evolve to transcend disciplines. Third, it offers an avenue for
climate reform through coalition-building between labor and environmental
*. Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I thank Lauren
Aronson, Derek Black, Josh Eagle, Katherine Garvey, Joy Radice, Ed Richards, Kathryn Sabbeth, Emily
Suski, Gavin Wright, and participants at the 2018 Texas A&M University School of Law’s Property
Roundtable and the 2018 Just Transitions Workshop at the University of South Carolina School of Law
for their thoughtful feedback on this project.
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interests. I offer guidance for effectuating the principle by synthesizing
instances of its embodiment in law in the Trade Act of 1974 (assisting
manufacturing communities), the President’s Northwest Forest Plan
(assisting timber communities), the Tobacco Transition Payment Program
(assisting tobacco farmers), and the POWER Initiative (assisting coal
communities), among other examples.
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INTRODUCTION
Political obstacles notwithstanding, many in the United States agree
that carbon emissions must be quickly and dramatically reduced in order to
avoid further catastrophic effects of climate change. Whether the path to a
decarbonized world is more winding or straightforward, the effects of a
transition to a low-carbon society will fall unevenly on many communities,
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which raises serious normative questions of justice. 1 In response to this
concern, many call for a “just transition” to a low-carbon future.2 While this
phrase has gained significant traction,3 its meaning remains unclear.4
“Just transition” has at least two primary usages. First, the phrase is
used to mean that the transition to a low-carbon society should be fair to the
most vulnerable populations. 5 The current fossil fuel-based economy has
been characterized by inequality and environmental injustice, or
environmental hazards that are inequitably distributed. 6 The new, lowcarbon economy should not repeat or exacerbate these injustices; in fact, the
transition is a new opportunity, indeed an obligation, to counteract them.7
The second meaning of “just transition” calls for protecting workers and
communities who depend on high-carbon industries from bearing an undue
burden of the costs of decarbonization.8 It proposes that the shift to a lowcarbon economy will affect certain livelihoods disproportionately, and that
1. Cf. Ann Eisenberg, Civil Society Versus Transnational Corporations in International Energy
Development: Is International Law Keeping Up?, in CHINA AND GOOD GOVERNANCE OF MARKETS IN
LIGHT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27 (Paolo Davide Farah ed., Routledge Pub., forthcoming 2019) (on
file with author) (arguing that civil liberties may be sacrificed in the name of clean-energy development
projects).
2. While this Article refers to “low-carbon” policy goals, these goals are assumed to also
contemplate other greenhouse gas emissions with similar effects relating to climate change. The
discussion focuses on carbon both for the sake of succinctness and because of carbon’s prominence
among the greenhouse gases as a driver of climate change.
3. See Ngram Viewer: Just Transition, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams
/graph?content=just+transition&year_start=1800&year_end=2017&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=
&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cjust%20transition%3B%2Cc0 (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (searching for the
frequency of the use of the term “just transition”).
4. Cf. Dimitris Stevis & Romain Felli, Green Transitions, Just Transitions? Broadening and
Deepening Justice, 3 KURSWECHSEL 35, 35 (2016) (Ger.) (“In short, there are varieties of Just Transition,
reflecting the politics of its various advocates.”).
5. See infra Section I.A.
6. See Peter Newell & Dustin Mulvaney, The Political Economy of the ‘Just Transition’, 179
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 132, 132–33 (2013) (discussing inequality and fossil fuel usage).
7. See MARK SWILLING & EVE ANNECKE, JUST TRANSITIONS: EXPLORATIONS OF
SUSTAINABILITY IN AN UNFAIR WORLD, 50–52 (2012); Victor B. Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without
the Other: The Challenge of Integrating U.S. Environment, Energy, Climate, and Economic Policy, 44
ENVTL. L. 1079, 1085 (2014) (discussing financial harms climate change has already posed to world
economies and vulnerable populations). As an example, some scholarship has raised concerns about
increased reliance on biofuels as a renewable energy source because of their potential to harm vulnerable
populations—which would illustrate an unjust transition to renewables according to this definition. See,
e.g., Nadia B. Ahmad, Blood Biofuels, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM 265, 282–94 (2017)
(discussing impacts on small farmers and poor consumers in developing countries); Carmen G. Gonzalez,
The Environmental Justice Implications of Biofuels, 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 229, 251–60
(2016) (discussing impacts on taxpayers, small farmers, and poor consumers in developing countries);
Uma Outka, Environmental Justice Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental Justice in the
Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60, 77–85 (2012) (discussing impacts
on Native American tribes and African American communities).
8. See infra Section I.A.
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this impact should be mitigated. 9 As one labor advocate explains, a just
transition “means tackling climate change in a way that respects workers.”10
This Article demonstrates that the latter, labor-driven concept of a just
transition is not only justified but is key to overcoming many of the obstacles
that plague climate reform. Environmental policy remains thwarted by a
variety of problems old and new. Longstanding “jobs-versus environment”
tensions persist, as well as the more general notion that environmental
protection represents a zero-sum game with winners and losers. 11 Even
before the current presidential administration, scholarship contemplated the
future of environmental law in an era of legislative stagnation.12 Many have
called for environmental law to adapt to the times by reshaping itself in
various ways—letting go of some of its traditional emphases,13 crossing over
into other doctrinal areas,14 and becoming more malleable in one manner or
another in order to better interact with the political, economic, and social
realities of a complex world.15
9. See David Doorey, Just Transitions Law: Putting Labour Law to Work on Climate Change, 30
J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 201, 206–07 (2017). In light of climate change,
energy and resource-intensive sectors are likely to stagnate or contract . . . new pressures will
be brought to bear on unemployment, adjustment, and training strategies . . . . There will be
winners and losers in domestic and international labour markets . . . . The idea of “just
transition” to a greener, lower carbon economy has its roots in the global labour movement . . . .
Just transition refers to a policy platform that advocates legal and policy responses and planning
that recognizes the needs for economies to transition to lower carbon economic activity, while
at the same time respects the need to promote decent work and a fair distribution of the risks
and rewards associated with this transition.
Id.; Newell & Mulvaney, supra note 6, at 133–34.
10. Josua Mata, What is ‘Just Transition’?, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Sept. 2016, at 21.
11. See Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328,
10330–32, 10340–43 (2017).
12. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law’s Heartland and Frontiers, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
511, 511–12 (2015) (“Environmental law is currently—and has been for some time—in a phase that is
simultaneously reassuring and worrisome. As a society, we have been generally well served by the fortyfive years of modern federal environmental law since 1970. . . . The unfortunate flip side of stability, at
least in this case, has been a marked degree of ossification.”); David W. Case, The Lost Generation:
Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
FORUM 49, 89 (2014) (“[T]he prospects that Congress will enact any such positive reform-minded
environmental legislation in the foreseeable future appear nonexistent.”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change
Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 407 (2010). But
see Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017) (arguing
that environmental protections have expanded and become more sophisticated and that overly pessimistic
narratives discount environmental law’s accomplishments).
13. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1281–91
(2014) (calling for rethinking of environmental law as dominated and characterized by canon of major
federal statutes enacted in 1970s, and proposing approaches that could work in antagonistic political
climate, integrate with non-environmental laws, and better approach climate change); Todd S. Aagaard,
Using Non-Environmental Law to Accomplish Environmental Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
35, 35 (2014); Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation
to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (2017).
14. See Aagaard, Environmental Law’s Heartland and Frontiers, supra note 12, at 512–13.
15. See Blake Hudson, Relative Administrability, Conservatives, and Environmental Regulatory
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The labor-driven concept of a just transition is powerfully poised to
address these deep concerns if scholars and policymakers embrace it. First
and most clearly, it reroutes jobs-versus-environment tensions into a
principle of “jobs and environment,” taking one of the longstanding thorns
in environmentalism’s side and marshaling it toward productive pathways.16
Second, by blurring the boundaries between environmental law and labor
law, it can help align environmental decisionmaking more with the realities
of complex social-ecological systems. 17 Third, by aligning environmental
interests with labor concerns, it creates potential for coalition-building, thus
informing both the ends of climate policy and the ever-elusive means for
achieving it.18 Finally, in an age of dramatic populist alienation,19 it would
inject much-needed economic equity considerations into environmental
decisionmaking.
Reform, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (2016) (arguing that geographic-delineation policies at state and
local level offers environmental reform plan that would be palatable to conservatives); Dave Owen,
Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 224–25
(2013) (arguing for applying quantitative spatial analysis to environmental law); Jedediah Purdy,
American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 169
(2012) (“Legal scholarship is in a bad position to make sense of [climate change] because the field has
concentrated on making sound policy recommendations to an idealized lawmaker, neglecting the deeply
held and sharply clashing values that drive, or block, environmental lawmaking.”); Rachael E. Salcido,
Rationing Environmental Law in a Time of Climate Change, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 621 (2015)
(arguing that “rationing” environmental law, in other words, selectively applying environmental law to
renewable energy because of climate change, is not ideal, but is nonetheless worthwhile “based on the
reality of political failures, market forces, and horrifying consequences of unchecked fossil fuel
dependence”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law: The Role
of Private Climate Governance, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 382, 383 (2015) (arguing for “opportunity to
buy time with private governance”).
16. Cf. Doorey, supra note 9, at 206–07.
17. Cf. Ruhl, supra note 12, at 407.
18. Cf. Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 82–
83 (1986) (criticizing environmentalism as separating ends of environmental policy from means
necessary to attain the ends). So-called “blue-green alliances”—instances of environmental groups and
labor groups joining forces to advocate for joint environmental and work-related platforms—demonstrate
the potency of measures that bridge the historical rift between labor and environmental concerns. Ann M.
Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological Systems, 47 ENVTL. L. 127, 145 (2017).
Notable examples exist of environmentalists acknowledging labor issues, and vice versa. In 1973, Sierra
Club President Mike McCloskey called for “the government ‘to indemnify workers who are displaced in
true cases of plant closures for environmental reasons.’” He argued, “[w]orkers should not be made to
bear the brunt of any nation’s commitment to a decent environment for all. Society should assume this
burden and aid them in every way possible.” LES LEOPOLD, THE MAN WHO HATED WORK AND LOVED
LABOR 309 (2007). Today, the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations have partnered with
large labor unions in a “blue-green alliance” to advocate for environmental reform alongside policies that
“create
and
maintain
quality
jobs.”
Members,
BLUE
GREEN
ALLIANCE,
https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/about/members (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
19. Cf. Scott D. Campbell, Sustainable Development and Social Justice: Conflicting Urgencies
and the Search for Common Ground in Urban and Regional Planning, 1 MICH. J. OF SUSTAINABILITY
75, 75 (2013) (noting that “middle-class environmental interests typically trump the interests of the poor
and marginalized, too often leading to an exclusionary sustainability of privilege rather than a
sustainability of inclusion”); Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 127.
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The Article also demonstrates that it is worth choosing one meaning for
this term and that the labor-driven meaning makes more sense than the
alternative. “Just transition” is a term of art that evolved in the labor
movement, first known as a “superfund for workers.”20 Its specificity gives
it potency, and it has already gained traction in other disciplines and with
major international organizations. 21 The broader usage, while important,
seems redundant alongside comparable but better-known concepts, such as
climate justice and energy justice.22 It is confusing and less productive for
different disciplines, and different scholars within law, to use the same term
with different understandings of its meaning.23
I therefore argue that in the context of climate change, the just transition
concept should be defined as some form of help for fossil fuel workers. Yet
the broadest theoretical impetus for this help goes beyond environmental
law. The just transition is an equitable principle of easing the burden that
publicly-driven displacement poses to workers and communities who are
highly dependent on a particular industry, especially a hazardous one. The
theory has flavors of an estoppel concept, an unclean hands argument, or
something akin to a call for takings compensation. 24 It is a principle of
distributive economic justice, insisting that those displaced should not alone
sustain their economic losses. This idea arises most frequently in response to
environmental progress, but it bears relevance to other contexts as well.25
20. LEOPOLD, supra note 18, at 417.
21. See discussion infra Section I.A.
22. See Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right
Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2010) (“Climate justice embraces a human rights
approach to advocating for rights and remedies for climate change . . . climate justice focuses on the rights
of those disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change.”); Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican
Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy Justice in Indigenous Communities, 56 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 369, 379 (2016) (though not yet a cohesive field of study, energy justice provides overall framework
to view related areas of climate justice, environmental justice, and energy democracy); see also Flatt &
Payne, supra note 7, at 1081 (noting that “[e]nergy poverty” recognizes inextricable linkage between
energy and “economics of the human condition.”).
23. Cf. Geoff Evans & Liam Phelan, Transition to a Post-Carbon Society: Linking Environmental
Justice and Just Transition Discourses, 99 ENERGY POL’Y 329, 333 (2016).
24. Both unclean hands and estoppel are longstanding doctrines of equity that attempt to inject
principles of fair play into parties’ dealings with one another. The unclean hands doctrine prevents parties
from profiting from their own wrongdoing, while the estoppel doctrine prevents parties from taking
inconsistent positions. See T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct in Retrospective:
Understanding Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (2013). Of course, it
is not contemplated that fossil fuel workers could raise such claims in court successfully. Rather, the ideas
underlying calls for just transitions seem to invoke similar principles: society should not profit
substantially from its hazardous industries only to abandon the workers in those industries, and nor should
it encourage fossil fuel development only to abruptly take the opposite stance. For a discussion of a
takings analogy, see infra Section II.B.
25. See discussion infra Section III.B for brief treatments of displacement resulting from taxi
drivers competing with ride-sharing services and displacement resulting from gentrification. A
forthcoming article, Distributive Justice and Rural America, further explores the just transitions concept
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The prospect of a law of just transitions raises many questions,
however, some of which labor law scholar David Doorey has begun to
explore in a germinal article examining the desirability of a potential new
field combining aspects of labor law, environmental law, and environmental
justice.26 How would just transitions relate to other models of distributive
justice, such as environmental justice, which maintains that the burdens of
pollution should be less discriminatorily and more equitably distributed?27
How would it relate to sustainable development, which aims to reconcile
environmental and economic considerations?28 Would it merely create new
employment opportunities when climate-related regulations affect a certain
sector, or is it what one union president called it—“a really nice funeral”?29
Must there be a causal link between regulatory initiatives and impacts on
jobs, or does a just transition also concern industry contractions that stem
from market forces?30 Can the two be meaningfully differentiated?31
This Article attempts to answer these questions. Part I provides
background necessary for understanding the just transitions concepts,
disambiguates the two different usages of the term, and argues that legal
scholarship should embrace the labor-driven definition. Part II explores three
avenues that could serve as theoretical justifications for the labor-driven just
transition principle in the context of climate change. Based on a theory of
distributive environmental decisionmaking, the history of injustice in
coalfield communities, and principles of political economy and interestgroup theory, the discussion concludes that the labor-driven just transition
as a principle of distributive economic justice. See generally Ann M. Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and
Rural America (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
26. See generally Doorey, supra note 9.
27. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 829 (1993).
28. See Outka, supra note 7, at 62–63 (“[S]ustainable development . . . means more than ‘greener’
economic development. Instead, it captures the interrelationship between the environment, the economy,
and human well-being in the effort to meet ‘the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.’”).
29. Dylan Brown, Mining Union Faces ‘Life-and-Death’ Test, E&E NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052929.
30. See infra Section II.B; see also Naomi Seiler et al., Legal and Ethical Considerations in
Government Compensation Plans: A Case Study of Smallpox Immunization, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 3,
14 (2004) (noting that the question of whether government should compensate someone raises the
question of whether government actor caused harm in question; noting, too, that government can act either
way out of compassion rather than obligation, and that causation by a non-government actor also raises
question of whether government failed to protect from harm).
31. Cf. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2003)
(“Focusing more directly on law as a dynamic phenomenon, on the benefits and costs of transitions, and
on other factors that may encourage or impede transitions might bring some coherence to [the] famously
incoherent area of [takings] law.”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509, 534 (1986) (“[N]one of the distinctions they offer for treating government and market risks
differently withstands scrutiny.”).
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principle is indeed legitimate, consistent with relevant norms, and necessary
in the face of climate change. Part III synthesizes major federal transitional
policies of the past several decades and argues that an effective law and
policy of just transitions, especially when targeting regional displacement,
must do more to untangle and address the complex, intertwined factors that
shape communities’ dependency relationships with particular industries.
The stakes of this inquiry are high. Coal miners have become a symbol
for broader national divisions, and commentators still strive to understand
the “urban/rural divide” that made its way into the national consciousness
via the 2016 presidential election. This analysis offers insights for the plight
of coal miners and other rural communities, as well as certain workers’
relationship with environmentalism and climate policy. It also implicates a
reconsideration of work, workplace safety, well-paying jobs, abrupt societal
change, and private and public accountability for many workers’ abject
vulnerability in a period that has been contemplated as a “new Lochner
era.”32 Major social and economic changes will continue to come. Scholars
and policymakers would be well-advised to contemplate more robust
transitional policy and baseline protections in light of the despair and
instability unmitigated transitions can yield.
I. WHAT IS A “JUST TRANSITION”? BACKGROUND AND
RHETORIC
A. THE TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY AND THE
TRANSITION’S POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
The term “just transition” tends to arise in two contexts. Some use the
expression to refer to more general principles of equity in the transition to a
low-carbon economy.33 In other words, the shift to a low-carbon economy is
an opportunity to rectify the injustices of the fossil fuel economy, and to not
do so, or to allow inequalities to worsen, would itself effectuate injustice. On
the other hand, some use the expression to refer to the nexus of labor and
environmental reform, or the approach of taking work and jobs into account
in or after environmental decisionmaking.34 Yet both meanings derive from
overlapping circumstances.
32. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, A New Lochner Era, SLATE (June 29, 2018), https://slate.com
/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-the-supreme-court.html.
33. SWILLING & ANNECKE, supra note 7; Caroline Farrell, A Just Transition: Lessons Learned
from the Environmental Justice Movement, 45 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 45 (2012) (“As we
transition away from a fossil fuel economy, we should . . . plan the transition not only to change the way
we use fuel, but to create a truly just economy.”).
34. Doorey, supra note 9, at 7.
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First, the fossil fuel-based economy characterizing the past century has
had many casualties. 35 They run the full gamut from a child developing
asthma in rural Australia, 36 to executions of community advocates in
Nigeria,37 to fishermen’s damaged livelihoods in the U.S. Gulf,38 to victims
of geopolitical machinations, including war.39 People of color, indigenous
communities, and people living in poverty have borne the worst burdens of
the fossil fuel economy, in large part because of energy production.40 The
ultimate “externality” is, of course, climate change, the impacts of which we
are already beginning to feel.41
The global community is currently experiencing substantial momentum
toward a low-carbon, “clean energy” economy.42 This transition is driven in
part by a prevalent desire to mitigate climate change, both in the United
States and elsewhere. 43 While the U.S. federal government is hostile to
environmental regulation,44 many U.S. states, cities, and institutions have
confirmed their ongoing commitment to reducing carbon emissions.45 For
35. See, e.g., Outka, supra note 7, at 68 (listing harmful health and environmental effects of fossil
fuel production and consumption).
36. Cf. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23.
37. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
941 (2001); see also Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from Environmental
Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 792 (2017) (explaining that the U.S. petroleum industry has caused
devastating human rights abuses in Africa and South America).
38. Debbie Elliot, 5 Years After BP Oil Spill, Effects Linger and Recovery Is Slow, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400374744/5-years-after-bp-oil-spill-effectslinger-and-recovery-is-slow.
39. E.g., Luis E. Cuervo, OPEC from Myth to Reality, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 433, 494 (2008).
40. Shannon Elizabeth Bell & Richard York, Community Economic Identity: The Coal Industry
and Ideology Construction in West Virginia, 75 RURAL SOC. 111, 139 (2010); Jeanne Marie Zokovitch
Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice—Does Green Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067,
1108 (2014).
41. See Outka, supra note 7, at 790 (explaining that the energy sector’s reliance on fossil fuels,
primarily coal, makes it the primary source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, a country
which has contributed more to climate change than any other country); Salcido, supra note 15, at 618–19
(listing effects of climate change already occurring, such as more severe, frequent storms).
42. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 330 (describing social movement for “post-carbon society,”
which ranges from grassroots, “bottom-up surveillance” and demands for more democratic and
decentralized energy sources, to major U.S. banks that have moved away from ever-riskier coal
investments).
43. See, e.g., Tom Murray, China Is Going All in on Clean Energy as the U.S. Waffles. How Is that
Making America Great Again?, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/edfenergyexchange/2017/01/06/china-is-going-all-in-on-clean-energy-as-the-u-s-waffles-how-is-thatmaking-america-great-again/2/#769f3bac340f.
44. Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump Is Changing the
Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 19, 2018), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017
/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment.
45. Devashree Saha & Mark Muro, Growth, Carbon, and Trump: State Progress and Drift on
Economic Growth and Emissions ‘Decoupling’, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu
/research/growth-carbon-and-trump-state-progress-and-drift-on-economic-growth-and-emissionsdecoupling.
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instance, “[d]ays after President Trump announced that he would be pulling
the U.S. out of a global agreement to fight climate change, more than 1,200
business leaders, mayors, governors and college presidents . . . signaled their
personal commitment to the goal of reducing emissions.”46 The transition is
also driven by market forces and concomitant evolutions in policy forces—
with “widespread recognition, including among utilities, that low-carbon
policy drivers are here to stay.”47 Internationally, countries have taken the
opposite approach to the Trump administration’s, such as with China’s plan
to invest $360 billion in renewable energy by 2020. 48 Altogether, these
factors have compelled some commentators to deem the transition to a lowcarbon society “inevitable.”49
Nevertheless, a world with low carbon emissions does not somehow
transform into a utopia. A shift to a clean-energy economy stands to
perpetuate or exacerbate current patterns of inequity. Those patterns could
specifically relate to low-carbon industries, for instance, through land theft
to develop wind and solar farms, forced labor to extract the natural resources
necessary to create solar panels, or impositions of health hazards from
biomass fuels.50 The patterns could also arise in other contexts in the lowcarbon world, such us through inequitable access to clean energy.51
While these novel risks have begun to receive more attention in
dialogues on climate change and the clean-energy transition, so, too, has the
slightly more controversial question of “jobs.” “Jobs versus environment”
tensions surround nearly every environmental policy debate. 52 Industry
advocates and workers argue frequently that environmental reform will
destroy individual livelihoods and communities’ entire way of life.53
46. Camila Domonoske, Mayors, Companies Vow to Act on Climate, Even as U.S. Leaves Paris
Accord, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/05
/531603731/mayors-companies-vow-to-act-on-climate-even-as-u-s-leaves-paris-accord.
47. Outka, supra note 7, at 793; Murray, supra note 43.
48. Nigel Topping, The Irreversible Rise of the Clean Economy in 2017, GREENBIZ (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/irreversible-rise-clean-economy-2017.
49. Id.
50. Outka, supra note 7, at 77–85; Stevis & Felli, supra note 4, at 43 (“Like the grey economy
before it, this Green Transition can be as exploitative of people and nature as the grey economy was, if
there is no countervailing power and vision.”).
51. Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable Development, 21 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 271 (2010).
52. Alex Geisinger, Uncovering the Myth of a Jobs/Nature Trade-Off, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 115
passim (2001); Carey Catherine Whitehead, Wielding a Finely Crafted Legal Scalpel: Why Courts Did
Not Cause the Decline of the Pacific Northwest Timber Industry, 38 ENVTL. L. 979, 981 (2008)
(describing the “classic” jobs-versus-environment “story”).
53. See, e.g., Garrett Ballengee & Michael Reed, Clean Power Plan: All Pain, No Gain for West
Virginia, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/289694clean-power-plan-all-pain-no-gain-for-west-virginia.
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Environmental groups—who have good reason to be cynical—have
historically responded to these claims with dismissiveness.54 Environmental
advocates have argued that concerns about jobs are either industry
propaganda or misinformed in some way.55 Complaints that environmental
reforms undermine jobs thus often encounter arguments that job losses are
not as bad as claimed, or even if they are, environmental reform provides a
net benefit to all that outweighs the cost of a few lost jobs.56
This tension raises the question: do environmental regulations cause
people to lose their jobs—with “lost jobs” often used as a rhetorical stand-in
for lost good jobs?57 And if they do, does the benefit to the greater good
offset the lost jobs? These questions are more complicated than they may
seem. A first, critical point is that the changes that are necessary for the
United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions adequately are
dramatic. 58 Thus, climate reform that is meaningfully suited to climate
change is not the same as the incremental environmental reforms of the past.
According to one interpretation, carbon emissions in the United States need
to decline by 40% over the next twenty years. 59 Methane and other
greenhouse gas emissions also need to be reduced at some level. 60 “To
accomplish this goal will require across-the-board cuts in both production
and consumption in all domestic fossil fuel sectors”61 and likely, in other
industries as well.62
54. See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 52.
55. E.g., id. See generally Lois J. Schiffer & Jeremy D. Heep, Forests, Wetlands and the
Superfund: Three Examples of Environmental Protection Promoting Jobs, 22 J. CORP. L. 571 (1997)
(describing as a “myth” that conflict exists between protection of environment and protection of jobs).
56. See, e.g., ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOHN IRONS, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER #305
REGULATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ECONOMY: FEARS OF JOB LOSS ARE OVERBLOWN 12 (2011)
(“Regulations can have broad economic benefits that may not be apparent at first blush. Clean air
regulations, for instance, significantly improve the health of workers and children, resulting in lower
health care costs and more productive workers.”); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation
on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 174 (1999) (noting benefits to communities of shifts away from
extractive industries); Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55.
57. Cf. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s Eroding
Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1763 (1993) (noting that plant closures of 1980s and 90s were “both
quantitatively and qualitatively different” than regular layoffs and socioeconomic transitions in the
number, size, and frequency of closings, as well as “disturbing patterns in the types of jobs lost and the
types of jobs gained”).
58. See Robert Pollin & Brian Callaci, A Just Transition for U.S. Fossil Fuel Industry Workers, 27
AM. PROSPECT 88, 89 (2016).
59. Id.
60. Maanvi Singh, Gassy Cows Are Warming the Planet and They’re Here To Stay, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO: THE SALT (Apr. 12, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/04/11/301794415/gassycows-are-warming-the-planet-and-theyre-here-to-stay (methane from livestock accounted for 39% of
agricultural greenhouse gas emissions in 2011).
61. Pollin & Callaci, supra note 58, at 89.
62. See generally, e.g., INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2010: AVIATION
AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2010) (reporting that aviation accounts for around 2% of total CO2 emissions);
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The “transition” is therefore a new era, which could involve a relatively
rapid restructuring of society. This rapid restructuring could involve quicker,
more extreme contractions of certain industries. According to economists
Robert Pollin and Brian Callaci, in this scenario, “workers and communities
whose livelihoods depend on the fossil fuel industry will unavoidably lose
out in the clean energy transition. Unless strong policies are advanced to
support these workers, they will face layoffs, falling incomes, and declining
public-sector budgets to support schools, health clinics, and public safety.”63
Yet even if the transition to a clean-energy economy involves more
incremental changes, it is worth contemplating whether the environmental
movement has itself periodically had a misinformed stance on the question
of work. As many have pointed out, environmental regulations have been
shown not to result in a net loss of jobs for a given society and may in fact
produce net gains in employment.64 This may seem to support the “greater
good” argument. Indeed, the clean-energy transition is anticipated to yield
dramatic growth in the ever-burgeoning green energy sector, creating
millions of new jobs over the course of the coming decades.65
However, regulations and other measures have at times also been shown
to catalyze job losses for discrete regions and sectors.66 Viewed through a
legal geographies lens—which holds that questions of scale, scope, and place
may show that what is “just” at one level is “unjust” at another 67 —this
collateral damage of environmental reform does seem more problematic. As
one commentator articulated, “[i]f you’re a coal miner in West Virginia, it’s
LISA J. HANLE ET AL., CO2 EMISSIONS PROFILE OF THE U.S. CEMENT INDUSTRY (2004) (noting that
cement production is a substantial CO2 emitter); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FAST FACT: U.S.
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 1990–2015, at 1 (2017) (noting that
transportation accounted for 27% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2015).
63. Pollin & Callaci, supra note 58, at 89.
64. Geisinger, supra note 52.
65. Pollin & Callaci, supra note 58, at 88.
66. Doorey, supra note 9, at 221 (“[N]ew regulations limiting emissions or requiring ‘green’
production equipment or techniques can affect production systems in ways that impact working
conditions, cause layoffs, or create downward pressure on labour costs.”); Alana Semuels, Do
Regulations Really Kill Jobs?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2017/01/regulations-jobs/513563 (“Regulations that seek to make air and water cleaner can also
cause concentrated job losses in certain industries and locations.”); see also Lands Council v. McNair,
494 F.3d 771, 779 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that an injunction of timber harvest would force timber
companies to lay off some or all of their workers); Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55, at 582.
No economic analysis can ignore the suffering of some rural communities, which bear the brunt
of the economic pain associated with reduced federally subsidized timber supplies. In addition
to lost jobs and the associated closure of local businesses, county governments are receiving
lower U.S. Treasury payments resulting from timber sales at the same time the county’s social
services are most in demand.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
67. Cf. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and
Criminal Law, 53 VILL. L. REV. 117, 122 (2008).
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not a great comfort that a bunch of guys in Texas are employed doing natural
gas.”68 While industry advocates undoubtedly exploit, or sometimes invent,
such harms, it is possible that the environmental movement has also turned
a blind eye to them.
Do job losses that are not clearly the proximate cause of legal reform,
but that stem from the evolution of market forces, also deserve attention?
Society did not, after all, provide special support to the employees of
Blockbuster when mail-order DVDs and online streaming took their place
because those services were more convenient and in demand. Why should
workers who lose in the transition to a low-carbon economy be given
preferential treatment over the many other workers who lose in diverse,
market-driven scenarios, if policymakers are not intentionally causing them
to lose for the greater good?
The question of causation is addressed in more depth in the subsequent
discussion, in which I argue that, especially in the energy sector, it is very
difficult to disentangle causal forces among law, policy, and market
operations. But further, workers’ dependency relationship with a particular
industry and lack of alternative options may be what trigger the need for a
just transition; in other words, equitable factors may drive this theory just as
much, if not more, than causal ones. Yet, again, these tensions also raise the
question of a possible choice between more robust transitional policies and
more robust protections for workers and communities in general.
B. DEFINING A “JUST TRANSITION”
The idea of a just transition originated with the labor movement in the
late twentieth century, in part in response to the environmental movement.69
Labor and environmental activist Tony Mazzocchi is credited with coining
the term, with the original version called a “Superfund for Workers.” 70
Referencing the superfund—a federally-financed program to clean up toxic
wastes in the environment—suggested Mazzocchi’s proposal was an
analogous remedial measure, but for human beings. It was based on the idea
that workers who had been exposed to toxic chemicals throughout their
careers should be entitled to minimum incomes and education benefits to
68. Jia Lynn Yang, Does Government Regulation Really Kill Jobs? Economists Say Overall Effect:
Minimal., WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy
/does-government-regulation-really-kill-jobs-economists-say-overall-effect-minimal/2011/10/19
/gIQALRF5IN_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f23e96256dfa.
69. Doorey, supra note 9, at 203; Newell & Mulvaney, supra note 6; Evans & Phelan, supra note
23, at 333; Stevis & Felli, supra note 4, at 35.
70. LEOPOLD, supra note 18, at 417.
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transition away from their hazardous jobs.71 Mazzocchi believed “that both
nuclear workers and toxic workers, ‘because of the danger of their jobs and
their service to the country, should be entitled to full income and benefits for
life even if their jobs are eliminated,’” although he later gave in to pressure
to reduce his demand to four years of support. 72 After environmentalists
complained that the word “superfund” “had too many negative
connotations,” the proposal’s name was changed to “[j]ust [t]ransition.”73
In the 1970s and through his death in the early 2000s, Mazzocchi and
his associates were involved in creating “powerful labor-environmental
alliances” that pursued the just transition campaign with the hope of
addressing “the jobs-versus-environment conundrum.”74 He was “the first
union president to negotiate partnerships with Greenpeace and the
environmental justice communities.” 75 He also developed educational
programs for workers on the environment. 76 Mazzocchi’s advocacy thus
forms the basis of the modern iteration of the labor-driven “just transition”
concept. This foundation shapes the term’s modern usage as the idea that
workers and communities whose livelihoods will be lost because of an
intentional shift away from hazardous activity deserve some sort of support
through public policy.77
Meanwhile, the broader usage of “just transition” is of less certain
origin. It appears to be the plain-language interpretation of the labor
movement’s term of art, thereby calling for “justice” more generally, and not
just for workers. In other words, it emphasizes the importance of not
continuing to sacrifice the well-being of vulnerable groups for the sake of
advantaging others, as has been the norm in the fossil-fuel-driven economy.
Thus, the broad concept of a “just transition” may in fact be even more
radical than the narrow one because the former calls for a grand restructuring
of societal inequality.
This discussion focuses on the labor-driven usage of just transitions and
argues that legal scholars should do the same for two main reasons, beyond
the fact that it is confusing for scholars in different spheres to be using the
71. Id.
72. Id. at 416.
73. Id. at 417.
74. Id. at 468.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. But see Caleb Goods, A Just Transition to a Green Economy: Evaluating the Response of
Australian Unions, 39 AUSTL. BULL. OF LAB. 13, 15 (2013) (“A just transition clearly seeks to resolve
the divisive jobs versus environment problem; however, actual union commitments to what a just
transition response constitutes can be assessed as variable and unclear.”).
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same emergent term with different meanings, and in addition to the
theoretical discussion below. First, the labor-related usage seems to predate
the broad usage and to have gained more traction. Major international
organizations have embraced the labor-related meaning. Just transitions for
workers have been adopted as goals by the United Nations Environment
Program, the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), and the World
Health Organization.78 In 2013, the ILO published a policy framework for a
just transition, which focused specifically on workers, noting that
“[s]ustainable development is only possible with the active engagement of
the world of work.”79
In addition, the labor-related usage’s specificity makes it stand out. The
broad call for justice shares similarities with other models used to call for
equity in the face of climate change, including environmental justice, climate
justice, and energy justice.80 This overlap may suggest that the broad concept
has less of a niche to fill than the narrow one, and more risk of redundancy.
By contrast, the labor usage’s narrowness may give it more potency.81 In
other words, it is not clear what a broad call for a just transition adds to these
powerful and better-known concepts of justice, which all relate directly to
the low-carbon shift.
Scholarly commentary complicates the choice somewhat because the
literature seems split between the two usages. The broad meaning appears in
at least some social science and legal scholarship. In a 2012 book entitled
Just Transitions, two sustainability scholars defined a just transition as one
“that addresses the widening inequalities between the approximately one
billion people who live on or below the poverty line and the billion or so who
are responsible for over 80 percent of consumption expenditure.” 82
Environmental justice scholar Caroline Farrell has characterized a just
transition as one that avoids “the problems with the fossil fuel
78.
79.

Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 333.
INT’L LABOUR ORG., GUIDELINES FOR A JUST TRANSITION TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTALLY
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES FOR ALL 3–4, 13 (2015) (advising governments to include
implementing workers’ skills training and engaging workers and their representatives in the means to
achieve low-carbon policies while creating and protecting employment).
80. Farrell, supra note 33, at 45 (discussing environmental justice); Shelley Welton, Clean
Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 573 (2017) (discussing “clean energy justice,” or the idea that
“the suite of policies boosting green jobs also creates a new genre of environmental justice challenges,”
and other inequitable effects of clean energy policies); see Ruhl, supra note 13, at 407 (noting “climate
justice” refers to the fact that climate change impacts will be felt unevenly throughout the world; the
capacity to adapt to climate change is also unevenly distributed).
81. See infra Section III.C; cf. Frederico Cheever & John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development
and Its Discontents, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 247, 282 (2015) (rejecting criticisms of “sustainable
development” as too vague to be useful).
82. SWILLING & ANNECKE, supra note 7, at xiii.
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economy . . . [and aims] to create a truly just economy,” or as a “transition
to an economy that does not create disparate environmental impacts.”83
Sociologists, political scientists, and several legal scholars who have
explored the labor-related meaning provide a solid foundation from which to
continue examining it. 84 They have also begun filling in the contours of
what, exactly, this usage of “just transitions” means. Rural sociologist Linda
Lobao interprets a just transition as one that “mov[es coal] communities
toward economic sectors that offer a better future.” 85 Interdisciplinary
scholars Evans and Phelan define it more broadly as “a political campaign to
‘ensure that the costs of environmental change [towards sustainability] will
be shared fairly. Failure to create a just transition means that the cost of
moves to sustainability will devolve wholly onto workers in targeted
industries and their communities.’”86
In the legal sphere, David Doorey’s definition emphasizes work
somewhat more. He explains the concept as “a policy platform that advocates
legal and policy responses and planning that recognizes the need for
economies to transition to lower carbon economic activity, while at the same
time respects the need to promote decent work and a fair distribution of the
risks and rewards associated with this transition.”87 Climate law scholar J.
Mijin Cha describes a just transition as “protecting workers who are
impacted by climate protection policy,” including by re-training workers and
providing them with education funds. 88 Ramo and Behles emphasize the
need to recognize communities’ economic dependency on high-emissions
activity as those communities transition away from that activity, suggesting,
like Labao, that a just transition “help[s] revitalize . . . fossil-fuel dependent
communities.”89
Calls for just transitions appear to arise the most in union advocacy,
which again lends weight to the choice of the labor-driven definition. The
83. Farrell, supra note 33, at 45, 49.
84. Linda Lobao et al., Poverty, Place, and Coal Employment Across Appalachia and the United
States in a New Economic Era, 81 RURAL SOC. 343, 343 (2016); Judson Abraham, Just Transitions for
the Miners: Labor Environmentalism in the Ruhr and Appalachian Coalfields, 39 NEW POL. SCI. 218,
218 (2017); Alan Ramo & Deborah Behles, Transitioning a Community Away from Fossil-Fuel
Generation to a Green Economy: An Approach Using State Utility Commission Authority, 15 MINN. J.
L., SCI. & TECH. 505, 507 (2014) (“A significant barrier to transitioning to clean energy sources is the
local economic dependency fostered by a fossil fuel economy.”).
85. Lobao et al., supra note 84, at 377.
86. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 331 (alterations in original) (internal quotation omitted).
87. Doorey, supra note 9, at 207.
88. J. Mijin Cha, Labor Leading Climate: A Policy Platform to Address Rising Inequality and
Rising Sea Levels in New York State, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 446 (2017).
89. Ramo & Behles, supra note 84, at 508.
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International Trade Union Confederation has described a just transition as a
“tool the trade union movement shares with the international community,
aimed at smoothing the shift towards a more sustainable society and
providing hope for the capacity of a ‘green economy’ to sustain decent jobs
and livelihoods for all.”90 Generally, just transitions advocates “highlight the
need to engage affected workers and their representative trade unions in
institutionalised formal consultations with relevant stakeholders including
governments, employers and communities at national, regional and sectoral
levels.”91
Despite the appearance of “justice” in the name of just transitions, few
legal commentators have delved more deeply into the legitimacy,
significance, or traits of the idea of a just transition. The next Part reviews
Doorey’s article, further characterizes the labor-driven just transition
concept, and explores what principles may or may not support the concept.
II. CAN A LAW OF JUST TRANSITIONS BE JUSTIFIED?
This Part asks whether incorporating the just transition principle into
law is a worthwhile endeavor, theoretically and practically. Exploring three
potential justifications for doing so—one based on environmental theory,
one based on the experiences of coal communities, and one based on
strategic considerations—the discussion reveals that pursuing just transitions
is not merely a nice thing to do. Rather, this discussion supports the
conclusion that the concept not only fits neatly within the sustainable
development framework—an internationally accepted framework for
reconciling competing interests in environmental decisionmaking—but that
it in fact injects a long-overlooked, much-needed consideration of economic
equity. 92 This Part argues further that coal communities are particularly
worthy of attention because of their history of combined exploitation and
dependence. This Part’s third argument relies on interest-group theory to
propose that the pursuit of just transitions is desirable because it could unite
environmental and labor groups around the goal of a potentially more
attainable and more equitable climate policy than prior efforts have secured.
90. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 333.
91. Id. Australia and Canada have also embraced the narrow just transitions meaning. The
Canadian Labour Council defines just transitions “as a political campaign to ‘ensure that the costs of
environmental change [towards sustainability] will be shared fairly. Failure to create a just transition
means that the cost of moves to sustainability will devolve wholly onto workers in targeted industries and
their communities.’” Id. at 331.
92. Should Equity Be a Goal of Economic Policy?, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Jan. 1998),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues16 (discussing economic equity as a principle that
economic resources, such as income, wealth, and land ownership, should be distributed fairly).
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David Doorey’s article is the first piece of legal scholarship to explore
the worthiness and potential contours of a body of Just Transitions Law
(“JTL”). He notes that labor law scholars have “mostly ignored” the effects
that climate change will have on labor markets, while environmental law
scholars have generally disregarded labor relationships. 93 Because neither
legal field seems adequately equipped to handle climate change, he considers
whether a new field is needed that combines the strengths of each.94
Doorey suggests that areas of common ground between labor and
environmental scholarship might be ripe for doctrinal synthesis, such as the
fact that both are in the business of “impos[ing] a countervailing power on
unbridled economic activity.” 95 Yet he also notes that “jobs versus
environment” tensions and other conflicting interests have tended to keep the
fields apart.96 Without coming to a firm conclusion as to whether JTL is
worthwhile as a new legal field, Doorey does conclude that a just transition
strategy is critical in the face of climate change, and that “[t]o implement a
just transition strategy, governments need to design policies that cross
existing government ministerial portfolios and legal regimes.”97
Doorey explores three potential forms for a body of law that marries
aspects of labor and environment, including: 1) “[a] [l]aw of [e]conomic
[s]ubordination and [r]esistance” that combines environmental justice’s and
labor law’s overlapping recognition of power relations and embrace of
collective, bottom-up resistance; 98 2) a law of “[h]uman [c]apital or
[c]apacities,” which would assess the fairness of rules, both environmental
and labor-related, based upon whether they further human capabilities and
freedom; and 3) an explicitly-named body of “Just Transitions Law,”
(“JTL”), which would draw upon existing just transitions policy strategies,
such as the ILO’s, aimed at joint consideration of environmental and labor
goals, including pursuing cross-sectoral collaboration, incentivizing
sustainable industries, and offsetting impacts to workers affected by
environmental policies.99
For his third proposal, the explicit body of JTL, Doorey provides three
93. Doorey, supra note 9, at 201.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 214.
97. Id. at 238.
98. Id. at 225 (“Also like labour law, environmental justice has roots in a bottom-up resistance
movement critical of a dominant legal system that benefits economically and politically powerful,
privileged segments of society. [Environmental justice] is a natural ally to labour law in a re-imagined
legal field organized around . . . subordination and resistance.”).
99. Id.
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“normative claims (NC) drawn from climate science, environmental law,
environmental justice, and labour law.”100 They include:
Firstly, climate change is a pressing global problem that market forces
alone will not adequately address. Therefore, states should respond
through public policy and law (NC1). Secondly, public policy should
encourage a transition towards “greener”, lower carbon economies (NC2).
Thirdly, there will be social and economic costs and benefits associated
with climate change, and with the transitional policies aimed at responding
to it, and those costs and benefits will also not be equitably distributed by
market forces alone. Therefore, governments should seek to minimize the
economic and social harms associated with the desired transition to a
greener economy, and attempt, through law and policy, to distribute those
harms and any resulting benefits in an equitable manner (NC3). 101

This discussion begins with Doorey’s third proposal and adopts his
normative claims for reference. While his first two proposals have great
appeal, his third one seems to capture the already-existing evolution of this
area of law.
However, like with the broadly-defined just transition described above,
one might ask what this set of normative claims adds to the concept of
climate justice. A centerpiece of the evolving theory of climate justice is
public policy geared toward equitable sharing of the burdens and benefits of
climate change through transparent consultation with diverse
stakeholders. 102 Climate justice also espouses recognition of the fact that
some communities are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than
others, and are more likely to be excluded from benefits.103
In order to capture the potency that more specific concepts may yield,
to avoid duplicative efforts, and to recognize the labor movement’s role in
formulating this theory of justice, I would add a fourth normative claim to
Doorey’s third proposal, whether explicitly or implicitly, which is justified
in more depth below: the needs of the workers and communities that have
developed dependency relationships with high-carbon industries, often with
substantial past and present socioeconomic costs, should specifically factor
into calculating the equitable distribution of harms and benefits in the
transition to a decarbonized economy. This consideration is not proposed as
a competitor to environmental justice, climate justice, or any other
100. Id. at 234.
101. Id.
102. Principles of Climate Justice, MARY ROBINSON FOUND., https://www.mrfcj.org/principlesof-climate-justice (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
103. Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic
Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 196 (2008); Ruhl, supra note 12, at 408.

292

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:273

framework concerned with vulnerability. It is, rather, a call for the specific
recognition of work and existing economic dependencies in the
decarbonization process, which have often gone overlooked.
This discussion does not take up the question of whether JTL should be
an entirely new area of law. Like Doorey’s, it is intended as an “early
contribution” to this emerging field. 104 The discussion therefore explores
instead whether the just transition principle is worthwhile, and how it could
be incorporated into law—which is perhaps also a worthwhile consideration
as an alternative to establishing a new legal field.
A. AN ENVIRONMENTAL THEORY OF JUST TRANSITIONS
The discussion in this Section argues that the labor-driven just transition
concept has a natural and important place within current prominent
distributive environmental decisionmaking frameworks. In other words, this
discussion seeks to legitimize the concept and situate it in relevant literature.
The discussion shows that the idea is neither foreign nor frivolous in relation
to environmental theory. But further, I argue that it adds a point of
consideration that other frameworks have tended to overlook, suggesting all
the more that it is a worthwhile idea.
The just transition concept, understood in the context of climate change,
is a call for distributive justice in (or after) environmental decisionmaking.105
In order to understand or define it, then, it is important to assess it in relation
to existing models for environmental distributive justice. Sustainable
development and environmental justice are two of the most prominent of
these models. 106 Each model strayed from traditional environmentalism,
which is largely focused on pro-conservation, anti-pollution measures, in
order to try to establish a framework that takes more socioeconomic realities
into account, including the need for equitable distribution of benefits and
burdens.107
Environmental injustice was originally known as environmental racism,
calling attention to the fact that communities of color bear a disproportionate
burden of environmental hazards.108 Sustainable development, meanwhile,
is a forward-looking decisionmaking paradigm that seeks to harmonize
conservation priorities with economic considerations as well as social
104. Doorey, supra note 9.
105. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
106. Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031 passim (2003).
See generally Guruswamy, supra note 51.
107. Outka, supra note 7, at 64–65.
108. Id.
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equity. 109 While environmental justice adds a civil rights component to
environmentalism, sustainable development aims to mitigate standard
development by incorporating historically overlooked priorities into
development decisions.110
The just transition concept exhibits a significant parallel with
environmental justice in that both ideas were born as social movements in
the late twentieth century in response to the environmental movement. 111
Environmental justice calls for racial equity (and other forms of nondiscrimination), while just transitions calls for labor equity. The movements
are thus not dissimilar in that each advocates a distributive component on top
of traditional environmentalism’s conservation priorities. Another parallel is
that each is a broad, equitable principle that is at times embodied in laws in
different ways. Yet the movements and legal schemes associated with each
concept have rarely interacted, in part because of conflicting priorities and
cultural backgrounds.112
Sustainable development, as compared to environmental justice, has
perhaps more direct applicability to the question of work. The sustainable
development approach aims to “capture[] the interrelationship between the
environment, the economy, and human well-being in the effort to meet ‘the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.’” 113 In other words, it is “a decisionmaking
framework to foster human well-being by ensuring that societies achieve
development and environment goals at the same time.” 114 Sustainable
development directly aims to undermine the fossil fuel economy. It thus, in
turn, creates the need for a “just transition,” in that it is fundamentally
premised on a shift to renewable energy sources.115 Yet it also may provide
tools for ensuring a just transition because of its concern for economic and
equity-related priorities.
109. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 51.
110. Outka, supra note 7, at 64.
111. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 333.
112. Id. at 331.
[W]hile there is potential synergy between environmental justice and just transitions
campaigns, a harmonious resolution of the two concepts is not guaranteed if the interests and
aspirations within the community are poorly negotiated between the parties involved. A
melding of environmental justice campaign goals on the one hand and labour movement goals
on the other, is particularly challenged by the continuing hegemony of the ‘jobs versus
environment’ discourse.
Id.
113. Outka, supra note 7, at 62–63.
114. John C. Dernbach, Creating Legal Pathways to a Zero Carbon Future, 46 ENVTL. LAW REP.
10780, 10782 (2016).
115. Outka, supra note 7, at 72–74.
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While sustainable development as a theory faces many criticisms, it is
“not simply an academic or policy idea; it is the internationally accepted
framework for maintaining and improving human quality of life.” 116 For
instance, based on the overall aim of sustainable development, international
frameworks have adopted as goals both poverty eradication and addressing
“[t]he deep fault line that divides human society between the rich and the
poor and the ever-increasing gap between the developed and developing
worlds . . . .”117 Sustainable development’s actual implementation takes on
many forms, as the approach “needs to be realized in the particular economic,
natural, and other settings of each specific country,” 118 as well as each
specific state or city. “The key action principle of sustainable development
is integrated decisionmaking. Essentially, decisionmakers must consider and
advance environmental protection at the same time as they consider and
advance their economic and social development goals.” 119 This contrasts
with conventional development, where environmental concerns historically
arose only as afterthoughts.120
Sustainable development decisionmaking is often represented as a
triangle. Its three points are the economy, the environment, and equity or
social justice.121 The points are a simplified representation of the three values
or priorities that sustainable development seeks to reconcile.122 The standard
sustainable development triangle is represented in Figure 1.
116. Dernbach, supra note 114, at 10782 (footnote omitted); see also Campbell, supra note 19, at
75.
[D]espite the perhaps inevitable criticisms of immeasurability and vagueness, sustainability has
endured as a central principle in urban planning because its oppositional engagement with social
justice and economic development continually reinvigorates sustainability planning, keeps the
term relevant and inclusive, and grants the task of urban planning greater urgency.
Campbell, supra note 19, at 75.
117. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Dev., U.N. Doc A/CONF.199/20, at 2 (2002).
118. Outka, supra note 7, at 64.
119. Dernbach, supra note 114, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19, at 83; Edward H. Ziegler, American Cities and Sustainable
Development in the Age of Global Terrorism: Some Thoughts on Fortress America and the Potential for
Defensive Dispersal II, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 110 (2005) (“[S]ocial equity, and
particularly intergenerational equity, along with resource conservation and environmental protection, are
central concepts in sustainable development philosophy.”).
122. These values are also referred to as “the three Es (Economy, Environment, and Equity)[.]
[S]ustainable development is often defined as an endeavor that strives to maintain equilibrium between
these domains.” Catherine L. Ross et al., Measuring Regional Transportation Sustainability: An
Exploration, 43 URB. LAW. 67, 69 (2010).
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FIGURE 1. Sustainable Development Framework

The triangle represents an accessible conceptualization of the harmony
that the decisionmaking paradigm seeks to achieve. In turn, these three
values are embodied in law and policy in varied ways. For example, a
traditional building code, reworked through the lens of sustainable
development values, could transform into a “green” building code,
prioritizing materials with minimal environmental impacts and low-carbon
energy sources. The “equity” prong might dictate that new housing
developments, as an example, should not only be green, but also affordable.
Environmental justice and sustainable development may seem like they
occupy different spheres of environmental theory, but Uma Outka has
observed that they have the potential for synergy. She notes a risk of conflict
between the two models as the broader sustainable development agenda
might prove insensitive to environmental justice concerns.123 For instance,
at the project level, sustainable development and environmental justice can
face tensions, such as if the siting of wind farms (comporting with
sustainable development’s driving concern for carbon reduction) harms
indigenous cultural resources (violating environmental justice’s concern for
communities’ autonomous decisionmaking and the non-discrimination
principle). 124 Yet Outka argues that environmental justice in fact refines
sustainable development by adding the particular environmental justice
123. Outka, supra note 7, at 66; see also Campbell, supra note 19, at 76 (“The sustainability and
social justice movements may be coming closer together, yet much still divides them into two separate
conversations that frequently overhear each other without easily merging.”).
124. Outka, supra note 7, at 85.
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conception of equity.125 She concludes that for sustainable development to
be consistent with environmental justice, the significant differences among
renewable energy sources require more recognition and concrete definition,
so that each pathway’s potential for inequity can be better understood and
addressed.126
Outka’s articulation of this relationship can thus perhaps be represented
by Figure 2 below, which highlights environmental justice as an aspect of
the sustainable development framework at the nexus of the environment and
equity points of the triangle. In other words, environmental justice becomes
another value that must be harmonized with other values in environmental
decisionmaking, including the three Es. As a principle of environmental
equity, environmental justice aligns with sustainable development at the
nexus of sustainable development’s environment and equity prongs.
FIGURE 2. Sustainable Development with Environmental Justice
Refinement

Figure 2 is not meant to suggest that environmental justice is the only
refinement to sustainable development, or the only point of interest on the
environment-equity leg. However, in a decisionmaking framework that is
intended to manage complex scenarios, understanding these relationships
can help inform the characteristics of normative paradigms. Environmental
justice is a call for environmental equity, and it has a natural locus in the
sustainable development paradigm.
125. Id. at 63; see also Campbell, supra note 19, at 77 (suggesting that environmental justice is an
“important subset of the larger field of urban sustainability”).
126. Outka, supra note 7, at 91.
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When viewed through the framework of sustainable development, just
transitions no longer seems like such a foreign concept to environmental law.
Primarily, environmental decisionmakers already have a framework for
considering questions of economic equity as they relate to environmental
decisionmaking. Just transitions, with its concern for avoiding or mitigating
inequitable impacts to livelihoods in environmental decisions, is ultimately
a doctrine of economic equity. Thus, a natural place for just transitions is
running parallel to environmental justice and in the analogous position along
the economic and equity side of the triangle, as shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. Sustainable Development Framework with Environmental
Justice and Just Transitions

This visualization is powerful because it suggests that, like
environmental justice, a just transition is simply a refinement to a framework
upon which decisionmakers already rely. While it might also be said to have
already existed along the economy-equity side, it has largely gone
unrecognized. Just as environmental justice is a principle of environmental
equity that must be harmonized with other values, the just transition is a
principle of economic equity that should also factor into the calculus—and
it appears to have a natural place within that calculus.
Another reason this visualization is powerful is that it builds upon
increasingly vocal calls for environmental justice to inform the transition to
a low-carbon society. 127 These calls, in fact, circle back on the broad
meaning of the just transition—the idea that the decarbonization process
127.

Id. at 122.
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must be done fairly in general. 128 One may be concerned that these
paradigms might all conflict with each other in the transition, or pose
difficult zero-sum choices. The visualization in Figure 3 shows that these
principles are complementary, and in fact, bring environmental
decisionmaking toward a more holistic picture of societal needs.129
This visualization may also help reconcile some of the tensions between
sustainable development theory and resilience theory. Resilience theory has
emerged as a counter-framework to sustainable development.130 Resilience
theorists’ criticisms of sustainable development are that sustainable
development assumes stationary, controllable circumstances; potentially
sanctions current patterns of harmful development and an ethic of “green
consumerism;” and fails to account for complexity, or the interrelatedness of
complex social-ecological systems. 131 This latter point is particularly
concerning to resilience theorists in the age of climate change, which will
involve more drastic changes in ecological and social regimes than
previously seen. 132 Resilience theorists instead advocate decisionmaking
paradigms that are iterative, or ongoing, rather than traditional planning
processes; that involve “principled flexibility;” 133 and that anticipate
constant change in social-ecological systems.134 Adaptive management and
adaptive governance have been considered potential vehicles for pursuing
resilience governance, although scholars agree that a gap remains between
theory and practice.135
Although the rift may be large, perhaps the addition of environmental
justice and just transitions to the sustainable development framework brings
sustainable development a modest inch closer to resilience thinking. The
more points of interest that are added to the sustainable development
framework, the more sustainable development would seem to wield potential
for decisionmaking that accommodates social-ecological systems. Figure 4
illustrates that the framework above can in fact represent a continuum of
128. Farrell, supra note 33, at 45.
129. Cf. id. at 51. Farrell uses the broad just transitions meaning, but she also concludes that holistic
decisionmaking is necessary going forward.
130. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation, supra note 18.
131. Melinda Harm Benson & Robin Kundis Craig, The End of Sustainability, 27 SOC’Y & NAT.
RES. 777, 779–80 (2014).
132. Id.
133. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 63–64 (2010).
134. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management,
67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); Flatt & Payne, supra note 7 at 1081.
135. Benson & Craig, supra note 131.
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social, economic, and natural concerns.136 While there are infinite points of
interest on the continuum, environmental justice and just transitions show
points of particular concern based on society’s historical and potential
inequities. If one recognizes that the sustainable development paradigm
could have infinite points, the next natural inference must be an acceptance
of uncertainty because infinite interacting aspects of social-ecological
systems could never be stationary.
FIGURE 4. Making Sustainable Development Work for Social-Ecological
Systems

In any case, the frameworks above show how the just transition concept
has a natural place with several prominent environmental theories of today.
But it can also follow the path of environmental justice and sustainable
development in that it may at times be a principle warranting contemplation,
136. The President’s Northwest Forest Plan, discussed below as an example of just transitions
policy that aided communities hurt by the decline in the timber industry, lends weight to the potential of
the just transitions concept to help bring sustainable development goals more in line with resilience
theory, although the Plan itself is considered a mixed success. Susan Charnley, formerly of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, said of the Plan:
From a social perspective, the Northwest Forest Plan as a model for broad-scale ecosystem
management is perhaps most valuable in its attempt to link the biophysical and socioeconomic
goals of forest management by creating high-quality jobs for residents of forest communities in
restoration, research, monitoring, and other forest stewardship activities that protect the
environment.
Susan Charnley, The Northwest Forest Plan as a Model for Broad-Scale Ecosystem Management: A
Social Perspective, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 330, 338 (2006).
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rather than all or part of a framework in and of itself. Both environmental
justice and sustainable development are “normative conceptual
framework[s]” that are in turn embodied in law in various ways, sometimes
simply as policy goals. 137 Just transitions can join their ranks as such a
principle as well, offering an additional equitable priority, or a more concrete
framework for decisionmaking.
In general, environmental law scholars have increasingly recognized
the need to account for the jobs question, rather than to dismiss it. 138 As
Richard Lazarus articulates, “there has been at best only an ad hoc
accounting of how the benefits of environmental protection are spread
among groups of persons.” 139 Environmental law scholars have recently
contemplated how to overcome the perception and reality of “zero-sum”
environmentalism, in which some segments of society must lose, or think
they are losing, in pursuit of environmental progress.140 This realization has
come about at the same time as the recognition that environmental law is
overall inadequate in the face of climate change.141 The placement of just
transitions into the framework above helps address both these concerns. It
provides a way to think about contemplating livelihoods in environmental
decisionmaking, as well as making decisionmaking align better with socialecological systems.
B. FOSSIL FUEL-DEPENDENT COMMUNITIES: AN EXEMPLARY CASE
STUDY FOR JUST TRANSITIONS
The discussion in this Section examines what, exactly, is meant by
“fossil fuel-dependent communities” and why they have prompted so much
interest in just transitions in the climate change era. Many communities that
depend on high-carbon industries have a unique history and relationship to
work, and many have borne profound costs associated with energy
production for over a century. 142 Yet the rest of society has alternately
encouraged, acquiesced in, or benefited from this hazardous, economically
depleting way of life.143 Based on these troubling circumstances, this Section
argues that the labor-driven just transition concept is legitimate because it is
fair to these specific communities. A critical point is to understand that fossil
fuel-dependent communities were not born in a vacuum. They were created.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Cheever & Dernbach, supra note 81, at 251.
Flatt & Payne, supra note 7, at 1079.
Lazarus, supra note 27, at 787.
Baker et al., supra note 11.
Craig & Ruhl, supra note 134.
Bell & York, supra note 40.
Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our Coal Miners, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 87 (2011).
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This discussion uses Appalachia as an example, but its story is relevant to
comparable scenarios throughout the country.144
As early as the 1700s, companies played a central role in developing
isolated Appalachian mono-economies, or monopsonies, where workers and
communities became hostage to desperate dependency relationships.145 The
dependence stemmed in part from a rush of speculators in the 1800s seeking
to acquire Appalachian land.146 Locals, mostly subsistence farmers, did not
know the worth of the minerals under their land and sold property interests
for well under market value.147 “Others who refused to sell their land became
victims of legal traps, such as being jailed and then offered bond in exchange
for their land.”148
Appalachia evolved into what some scholars call an “internal colony”
or a “sacrifice zone,” which was “created to provide cheap resources to fuel
the rest of the country.” 149 Companies dominated land ownership and
isolated communities from penetration by other industries. 150 Through
isolating people and dispossessing them of land, coal companies sought to
turn local residents “into a docile workforce” that lived and breathed
extractive work, residing in company towns and coal camps and paid in
“scrip” instead of money.151 While company towns are no longer the norm,
the effects of these relationships are still felt in Appalachia today. Yet this
was all in the name of “the greater good,”152 with fossil fuel communities
serving as the nation’s cheap energy powerhouse.153
Serving as the nation’s energy powerhouse has been costly. For
decades, coal miners have lost their lives in and because of the mines.154
Some of these deaths were in major disasters that caught the public’s
attention, but most of them were a regular procession of daily accidents and
health harms. 155 These hazards are not a phenomenon of history, either.
“Between 1996 and 2005, nearly 10,000 miners died of black lung
144. See, e.g., discussion infra Section IV.C about Native American community in mixed
environmental justice/economic dependency relationship with coal-fired power plant.
145. Ann M. Eisenberg, Beyond Science and Hysteria: Reality and Perceptions of Environmental
Justice Concerns Surrounding Marcellus and Utica Shale Gas Development, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 183,
199 (2015); see also Bell & York, supra note 40, at 119.
146. Bell & York, supra note 40, at 119.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 120.
152. Lofaso, supra note 143, at 88.
153. Bell & York, supra note 40, at 119–20.
154. Lofaso, supra note 143, at 89.
155. Id.
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disease.”156 As of this writing, black lung rates have in fact been rising.157
Yet the costs have not been limited to miners themselves. Residents living
near mountaintop removal sites suffer high rates of disease and morbidity.158
In addition to compromised health and safety, residents of fossil fuel
communities have seen the destruction of irreplaceable cultural and
ecological resources, as well as entrenched poverty and limited economic
alternatives.159
Yet throughout the evolution of this exploitative dynamic, these
relationships were encouraged and actively supported by the rest of the
country through law and policy, evolving with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the larger political body despite intermittent recognition of
Appalachian problems. When coal miners sought to improve their conditions
in the early twentieth century, federal actors intervened on behalf of
companies.160 In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court
sanctioned mine operators’ power to contract with workers to prevent
unionization. 161 In the 1921 Battle of Blair Mountain, the United States
Army intervened to stop an uprising of miners, after which the Army left
West Virginia to resolve the conflict internally, much to the detriment of the
miners.162 Black lung, a “chronicle of a preventable disease that was not
prevented,” was ignored by state and federal public health authorities for
most of the twentieth century “[d]espite the fact that physicians working
among coal miners in the nineteenth century recognized and called attention
to . . . [this] public health disaster.” 163 These egregious conditions
notwithstanding, throughout the twentieth century, tax incentives and
subsidies to the fossil fuel industry became a part of law.164 As of 2017, the
federal government continued to support fossil fuel production with $14.7
billion in subsidies, and state governments provided a total of $5.8 billion in
incentives.165
156. Id.
157. David J. Blackley et al., Continued Increase in Prevalence of Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis
in the United States, 1970-2017, 108 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1220, 1221 (2018).
158. APPALACHIAN VOICES, THE HUMAN COST OF MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL COAL MINING:
MAPPING THE SCIENCE BEHIND HEALTH AND ECONOMIC WOES OF CENTRAL APPALACHIA 1 (2012).
159. See generally CHAD MONTRIE, TO SAVE THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF
OPPOSITION TO SURFACE COAL MINING IN APPALACHIA (2003).
160. Lofaso, supra note 143, at 94–95.
161. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250–52 (1917).
162. Evan Andrews, The Battle of Blair Mountain, HISTORY (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://www.history.com/news/americas-largest-labor-uprising-the-battle-of-blair-mountain.
163. Brian C. Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the Shaping of Administrative Justice, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2002).
164. Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States: A “Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 162 (2013).
165. JANET REDMAN, OIL CHANGE INT’L, DIRTY ENERGY DOMINANCE: DEPENDENT ON DENIAL:
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Meanwhile, coal communities’ suffering was not unknown. Congress
made a show of helping Appalachian residents with measures such as the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”). Yet SMCRA
“has fallen far short of its potential;”166 indeed, with provisions providing for
oversight by states known to be dominated by industry,167 it could hardly be
deemed an earnest effort to remedy Appalachian suffering. Similarly, the
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1973 nominally addressed black lung, only to
help a mere 7.6% of claimants in “a system that miners, unable to attract
attorneys and financially incapable of matching the coal companies’
development of medical evidence, wholeheartedly despise[d] as unjust.”168
U.S. society thus has a decades-long tradition of propping up the fossil
fuel industry and acquiescing in its creation of exploitative mono-economies.
Viewed in this light, workers’ and communities’ anticipation or hope that
support might continue for their sole economic lifeline seems less
unreasonable than if one views that anticipation standing alone in the context
of today’s changed markets, or viewed through the lens of communities with
more resources or alternative options.169 The argument that fossil fuels are
harmful and that people simply have to find other jobs overlooks a
longstanding history of exploitation and isolation, an abusive tradition from
which the majority has benefited. A swift, unmitigated shift away from these
industries stands to exacerbate the injustices that fossil fuel communities
have already experienced. The transition has, in fact, already begun, and
fossil fuel communities have not fared well.170 Coal country has already lost
a substantial portion of employment opportunities, and with those lost jobs
have come lost tax resources, businesses, population, and spirit.171
One might argue that this is the nature of economic developments:
markets change and workers and communities who bear the losses of those
HOW THE U.S. FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON SUBSIDIES AND CLIMATE DENIAL 5 (2017).
166. Mason Adams, A 40-Year-Old Federal Law Literally Changed the Appalachian Landscape,
W.VA. PUB. BROADCASTING (Aug. 5, 2017), http://wvpublic.org/post/40-year-old-federal-law-literallychanged-appalachian-landscape#stream/0.
167. See Robert E. Beck, The Current Effort in Congress to Amend the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 607, 617–18 (1997).
168. Murchison, supra note 163, at 1027.
169. Cf. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL.
U. L. REV. 19, 19 (1997) (“[E]xpectations, particularly reasonable expectations, are at the heart of many
legal doctrines. Contract, property and tort claims are often justified on the grounds that they protect
reasonable expectations.”).
170. See, e.g., Chris McGreal, America’s Poorest White Town: Abandoned by Coal, Swallowed by
Drugs, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/12/beattyvillekentucky-and-americas-poorest-towns.
171. See Annalyn Censky, Coal ‘Ghost Towns’ Loom in West Virginia, CNN MONEY (May 26,
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/26/news/economy/west_virginia/index.htm.
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transitions must adapt, evolve, and potentially relocate. Yet attempts to
distinguish between the public and private spheres in this context ring
hollow. First, fossil fuel workers and communities have been engaged in
what should be characterized as quasi-public activity. 172 While their
contributions to the nation’s energy supply were through direct relationships
with private companies, those companies were empowered by the public.
The workers’ and communities’ labor and losses fueled a public electricity
grid and provided fundamental public benefits for which they bore
immeasurable externalized costs.
Second, one would be hard-pressed to disentangle the diverse public
and private factors that converge to shape discrete sectors, especially in the
energy context.173 Many have pointed to the cheapness of natural gas as a
driving force undermining the coal industry in order to suggest that coal’s
decline is a private phenomenon not warranting mitigation. 174 However,
Congress’s decision to impose minimal regulations on the natural gas
industry was an intentional public policy development that shaped the status
quo in foreseeable ways.175
These circumstances illustrate that, if nothing else, principles of fairness
and equity weigh in favor of a just transition for these communities. Yet these
principles also implicate some of the basic premises of our legal system.
Communities’ expectations and reliance have been encouraged, even
coerced, through law and policy. While formal legal avenues have been of
little help to them—to demand, for instance, the delayed closure of a plant,
collective compensation for environmental degradation to the region, or
172. See Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and Social
Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 305, 425 (2013) (noting that coal country’s
sacrifice “ha[s] helped power and build a nation”).
173. Kaplow, supra note 31, at 534 (“[M]ost commentators . . . defend mitigation of government
risks, but not of market risks. Yet none of the distinctions they offer for treating government and market
risks differently withstands scrutiny . . . . [T]here is little to distinguish losses arising from government
and market risk.”).
174. TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., COLUMBIA CTR. ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY, CAN COAL MAKE A
COMEBACK? passim (2017), https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Center_on_Global
_Energy_Policy_Can_Coal_Make_Comeback_April_2017.pdf; Matt Egan, What Killed Coal?
Technology and Cheaper Alternatives, CNN (Aug. 21, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/21
/investing/coal-power-trump-epa/index.html; Andrew Sorensen, Natural Gas and Wind Energy Killed
Coal, Not ‘War on Coal’, CU BOULDER TODAY (May 7, 2018), https://www.colorado.edu/today/2018
/05/07/natural-gas-and-wind-energy-killed-coal-not-war-coal.
175. Eisenberg, Beyond Science and Hysteria, supra note 145, at 207 (discussing exemptions for
hydraulic fracturing in federal environmental statutes); see also Michael Pappas, A Right to be
Regulated?, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 118–20 (2016) (arguing that regulatory changes may destroy
the value of previously regulated utilities); cf. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s
Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 345, 372–74 (2014) (“The harm resulting from
inaction can be just as damaging as the harm resulting from overt action.”).
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meaningful assistance with the black lung pandemic—the ethical impetus to
help these communities transcends a mere nicety.
Several lines of scholarship have insisted upon the materiality of
expectations at the community level. Joseph Sax was concerned with
community reliance and formal property law’s silence on communities.176
He argued “that the law offered no opportunity even to raise a question about
the non-economic losses incurred when an established community is
destroyed . . . for ‘just compensation’ includes only the value of the
economic interests taken.”177 He noted that:
there is a widespread sense that community is important, and a willingness
exists to protect community interests; yet there is no principle or doctrine
to which to turn in those cases where, for whatever reasons, the people
affected are unable to generate the political support necessary to induce an
act of grace.178

Sax argued that “[t]he idea of justice at the root of private property
protections calls for identification of those expectations which the legal
system ought to recognize,” including at the community level.179
The concern for community reliance evokes the related concern that
frustrated expectations can lead to social instability and political upheaval.180
For instance, Sax argued that the public trust doctrine was not merely a
state’s obligation to conserve natural resources, as many understand it, but is
also a means of marrying customs with formal law in order to respect
common expectations and ward off social unrest.181
This line of thinking seems to suggest that where formal law fails to
recognize the meaningful nature of coal communities’ reliance upon their
way of life, the lens of first principles illuminates the way of life as
meaningful and worth respecting. The reasons for undermining that way of
life seem meaningful too. Fossil fuel communities have already been
sacrificed for the sake of collective progress through their energy production
activities. They stand to be sacrificed anew if their majoritarian-encouraged
dependency relationships are ignored in the transition to clean energy, as
state and federal policy drivers continue to curtail or undermine these
176.
Joseph L. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights—The National Parks as a Laboratory of New
Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 499 (1983).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 500.
179. Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 185, 187 (1980) (emphasis added).
180. See id. at 186–88.
181. Id.
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communities’ economic activities in the name of collective progress.182
While the majority’s willingness to destroy coal communities’
dependency relationships is not a “takings,” it nonetheless raises the prospect
of a discrete minority being sacrificed for “the greater good”—an approach
to progress that legal ethicists have considered at best morally
questionable. 183 Indeed, when federal legislators passed provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974 to offset displacement caused by reduced restrictions on
trade, 184 one decisionmaker reasoned, “much as the doctrine of eminent
domain requires compensation when private property is taken for public
use,” increased fair trade required compensation to displaced workers. 185
“Otherwise the costs of a federal policy [of free trade] that conferred benefits
on the nation as a whole would be imposed on a minority of American
workers.”186
It might be suggested that Appalachia and other carbon-dependent
communities are not unique in their situation. Workers in the United States
are often displaced and left vulnerable for a variety of reasons including
changes in technology, new trade regimes, other policy developments, or the
absence of legal protections.187 This comparison is worthwhile. The story of
Appalachia, while unique in some respects, shares many analogies, as with
tenants and sharecroppers who were displaced by the mechanization of the
cotton harvest, plant employees who lost manufacturing jobs when
businesses moved overseas, and aerospace workers who were displaced
during the 1990s with the end of the cold war, to name some examples.188
The question becomes one of drawing lines. Where takings analyses stop,
economic transitions begin. We ask people to bear the costs of the latter, not
the former, and by not recognizing property interests in work, 189 we disfavor
182. Cf. LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Michael B.
Gerrard & John C. Dernbach eds. 2018); Chris Bataille et al., The Need for National Deep
Decarbonization Pathways for Effective Climate Policy, 16 CLIMATE POL’Y 1 (2016).
183. See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1180–81 (1967).
184. Erin Fleaher Rogers, Agricultural Trade Adjustment Assistance: Food for Thought on the First
Decade of the Newest Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 561, 562 (2014).
185. Int’l Union v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Malcolm Bale & John Mutti, Income Losses, Compensation, and International Trade,
13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 278, 283–84 (1978); Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40
STANFORD L. REV. 3 (1988); Seth Mydans, Displaced Aerospace Workers Face Grim Future in
California Economy, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/03/us/displacedaerospace-workers-face-grim-future-in-california-economy.html. See generally DOES REGULATION KILL
JOBS? (Cary Coglianese et al., eds. 2015).
188. See Bale & Mutti, supra note 187; Singer, supra note 187; Mydans, supra note 187.
189. Philip Levine, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 Buff. L. Rev. 1081 (1973); Robert
Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 Ecology L.Q. 307, 321 (2007). Takings
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the property-less in decisions as to who receives compensation.190
This line-drawing may make sense. Otherwise, it could become costprohibitive to pass new laws. Yet certain factors weigh in favor of
contemplating either more effective transitional policies or more robust
baseline protections for workers and communities. First, as technology
continues to evolve and render more work obsolete, the future will be replete
with ongoing displacement.191 As more and more people and professions are
displaced, it seems unrealistic to assume that the supply of work will match
the demand for it. Second, the egregious ramifications of the transition away
from coal indicate that asking those workers and communities to bear the
losses, adapt, and relocate has simply not worked for a substantial segment
of those communities. While such a proposed allocation of losses may make
sense in theory, in practice, the result has been poverty, deaths of despair,
and regional stagnation.192
To be clear, none of this discussion is intended to suggest that deep
decarbonization should not be pursued as swiftly and effectively as possible.
The question of livelihoods should not hold the broader community hostage
to the dire fate associated with a failure to reduce carbon emissions
adequately.193 This is also not a call for some form of reparations, especially
considering other communities, such as indigenous populations and the
descendants of slaves, whose under-acknowledged exploitation also fueled
jurisprudence does not recognize as property “the mere ability to conduct a business, as something
separate from the business’ assets” or “permits and licenses if nontransferable and revocable.” Meltz,
Takings Law Today, supra, at 321. In a 1933 opinion in Lynch v. United States, the Court held that valid
contracts could be property for takings purposes. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 571 (1933). In
1995, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the Court effectively
overruled Lynch in 1986 “to the extent that [Lynch] flatly holds that contracts are property that the
government may not take without compensation . . . [an] analysis [that] does not resemble the takings
jurisprudence of today.” Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Jay Cty., Ind., 57 F.3d 505, 510 n.2 (7th Cir.
1995) (discussing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986)).
190. Doremus, supra note 31, at 3 (“Regulatory takings claims are fundamentally conflicts over
legal transitions. They arise when the rules change, those changes are costly (in economic or other terms),
and the people bearing the costs believe that they are being unfairly singled out.”).
191. James Manyika et al., Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: What the Future of Work Will Mean for Jobs,
Skills, and Wages, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Nov. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-andwages; James Doubek, Automation Could Displace 800 Million Workers Worldwide by 2030, Study Says,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/11/30
/567408644/automation-could-displace-800-million-workers-worldwide-by-2030-study-says.
192. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, Death Maps Show Where Despair Is Killing Americans, NBC (Mar. 13,
2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/death-maps-show-where-despair-killingamericans-n856231; Alec MacGillis, The Original Underclass, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/the-original-underclass/492731.
193. Cf. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF
IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5C APPROVED BY GOVERNMENTS (2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/session48/pr_181008_P48_spm_en.pdf.
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national wealth in even more dire ways. The argument is rather that fossil
fuel communities have already borne loss after loss to the benefit of others.
To ask them to bear yet another disproportionate loss in the clean-energy
transition on behalf of the rest of society would be to effectuate yet another
distributive injustice. In other words, these communities should not be
forgotten in the decarbonization calculus. They deserve a just transition.
C. A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF JUST TRANSITIONS
This Section explores a pragmatic and strategic argument in favor of
embracing the just transition concept. In short, the United States is in urgent
need of environmental and climate policy reform at the federal, state, and
local levels. 194 Reform is often unachievable, however, because of
entrenched political obstacles.195 This Section argues that the pursuit of law
and policy informed by just transitions principles may be more achievable
than more traditional modes of seeking environmental reform.
Most scholars now agree that environmental reform had a zenith of
sorts, and that the zenith has passed.196 The late 1960s and early 1970s saw
the passage of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.197 Still today, these major federal
statutes make up the foundation of the environmental legal apparatus. The
reforms largely came out of a national social movement. 198 Reacting to
works such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 199 and the incident of the
Cuyahoga River catching fire,200 the public realized that their welfare in part
depended upon some measure of environmental protection.201
Sporadic successes have been achieved since the peak of environmental
reform. As recently as 1993, Daniel Farber observed how
environmentalism’s successes undermined the idea that interest groups could
warp governmental policy through lobbying.202 He explained:
194. Ruhl, supra note 12, at 392.
195. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1241 (2014).
196. Id. at 1240.
197. Id. at 1251–54.
198. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and
Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1002 (1994).
199. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
200. Jonathon Adler, The Fable of the Burning River, 45 Years Later, WASH. POST (June 22, 2014),
https://wapo.st/1lgHyz8?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.e1b92a32a102.
201. Plater, supra note 198 passim.
202. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59,
60 (1992).
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[A]ir pollution legislation benefits millions of people by providing them
with clean air; it also imposes heavy costs on concentrated groups of firms.
The theory predicts that the firms will organize much more effectively
than the individuals, and will thereby block the legislation. We would also
expect to find little regulation of other forms of pollution. Similarly, we
would also expect firms to block legislation limiting their access to public
lands. Thus, the two basic predictions are that environmental groups will
not organize effectively and that environmental statutes will not be
passed.203

Yet Farber concluded that “the reality is quite different.” 204
“Environmental groups manage to organize quite effectively. . . . . Nor,
obviously, is there any dearth of federal environmental legislation.”205 He
thus argued that “the political system manages to overcome the inherent
advantages of special interests.”206
A more recent article by the same author recognizes a largely different
status quo, however. In his 2017 article, The Conservative as
Environmentalist, Farber recognizes that interest groups do indeed now
stand in the way of environmental reform.207 He suggests that conservatives’
shift away from moderate environmental sympathies over the past several
decades can be explained by the “emergence of a coalition of disaffected
westerners and business interests (particularly in the fossil-fuel industry)
supported by an interlocking network of foundations, donors, and
conservative-policy advocates.”208
A movement does exist today that is not all that different from the
environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s.209 Much of the American
public is deeply concerned about climate change. 210 The movements for
climate reform and related principles, such as climate justice and energy
justice, use activism, litigation, and lobbying to pursue much-needed
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id. at 61.
207. Daniel A. Farber, The Conservative as Environmentalist: From Goldwater and the Early
Reagan to the 21st Century, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2017).
208. Id.
209. See generally Jonathan Mingle, Fighting for the Future, 5 ENVIRONMENT@HARVARD 1
(2013).
210. Lydia Saad, Global Warming Concern at Three-Decade High in U.S., GALLUP (Mar. 14,
2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/206030/global-warming-concern-three-decade-high.aspx; Robinson
Meyer, What Americans Really Think About Climate Change, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/04/climate-polling-burnout/523881.
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changes. 211 Many successes have been achieved. 212 Most commentators
concede, however, that progress to date has simply been inadequate to ward
off the disastrous effects of climate change.213
Anti-environmental forces today seem to have become more powerful
than in prior eras. 214 The fossil fuel industry manages to undermine the
environmental movement even at the grassroots level. 215 Pat McGinley
describes, for example, the so-called “War on Coal” campaign, a massive,
industry-financed public relations effort “buttressed by think-tank studies”
that has successfully fueled public antipathy toward environmental
regulations.216 According to sociologists Bell and York, despite its waning
contributions to the economy and employment, the fossil fuel industry
manages to “gain[] compliance from substantial segments of the public” by
“actively construct[ing] ideology that furthers its interests.”217
As the fossil fuel industry and conservative politicians have joined
forces, labor and workers’ groups have often sided with them. 218 According
to sociologist Brian Obach, “workers are not typically the lead opponents of
environmental measures.” 219 Rather, industry executives recruit workers
with the threat of layoffs or total shutdowns of operations. In addition, as “a
threat to corporate profits” is not particularly concerning to the public,
workers also become the more sympathetic faces of environmental
opposition.220
211. Sebastien Malo & Sophie Hares, On the Boil: Five Climate Lawsuits to Watch in 2018,
REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-climatechange-lawsuit-factbox
/onthe-boil-five-climate-lawsuits-to-watch-in-2018-idUSKBN1EM0J7.
212. For example, California achieved its 2020 target for reduced greenhouse gas emissions four
years early, see CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR 2000 TO
2016 (2008), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_2016/ghg_inventory_trends_0016.pdf, plaintiffs seeking more stringent regulations have succeeded in litigation based on the Clean Air
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the California Environmental Quality Act, see Sabrina McCormick
et al., Strategies In and Outcomes of Climate Change Litigation in the United States, 8 Nature Climate
Change 829 (2018), and major cities have committed to aggressive greenhouse gas reductions as well as
the goal of limiting global warming to one-and-a-half degrees Celsius, Milman et al., The Fight Against
Climate Change: Four Cities Leading the Way in the Trump Era, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jun/12/climate-change-trump-new-york-city-san-franciscohouston-miami.
213. Ruhl, supra note 12, at 411–12.
214. ANDREW ROWELL, GREEN BACKLASH: GLOBAL SUBVERSION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (1996).
215. Eisenberg, Beyond Science and Hysteria, supra note 145, at 200; Eisenberg, Alienation and
Reconciliation, supra note 18, at 154.
216. McGinley, supra note 1702, at 316.
217. Bell & York, supra note 40, at 139.
218. BRIAN OBACH, LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: THE QUESTION FOR COMMON
GROUND (2004).
219. Id. at 9.
220. Id. at 11.
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Commentators have observed the largely untapped potential of
collaboration between environmental and labor groups. The longstanding
“work-environment” rift often puzzles scholars. 221 While jobs-versusenvironment tensions serve to divide the two camps, other areas seem like
they should be unifying—for instance, workplace safety, shared concerns
about basic human needs, and as Doorey observes, the fact that both fields
serve as checks on what would otherwise be “unbridled” corporate
activity.222
One explanation for the rift is environmentalism’s association with the
middle class and upper middle class. In its early days, the environmental
movement was spurred in large part based on a philosophy embracing a
veneration for nature.223 As one activist articulates,
environmental heroes like John Muir, Teddy Roosevelt, and Aldo
Leopold—and the romanticizing of wilderness through art, poetry, essays,
and music—created a catalyst for men to see communing with nature as a
way of defining their manhood. Exploration, solitude, and game hunting
became the foundation for saving and preserving nature. But for whom
was nature being saved?224

As the activist suggests, this philosophy arguably disregards the needs
of society’s less privileged ranks, for instance, by failing to prioritize issues
such as immediate access to clean drinking water, or being overly dismissive
of livelihoods that depend on natural resources. 225 Pruitt and Sobczynski
have argued, for example, that poor, white rural residents may be seen as
“trash[ing] pristine nature by their very presence.”226
Yet, in the instances when labor and environmental groups have
combined their efforts, these efforts have proven quite potent. Many attribute
the passage of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act to a coalition
between workers and environmental organizations. 227 A prior article,
Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological Systems, examined the
fruitfulness of collaborative partnerships between ranchers and bird
221. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation, supra note 18, at 140–47.
222. Id.; Doorey, supra note 9, at 221.
223. Jenna Hanson, The Modern Environmental Movement’s Big Failure, PAC. STANDARD (Apr.
17, 2015), https://psmag.com/environment/the-modern-environmental-movements-big-failure. But see
Montrie, supra note 159 (discussing the untold history of popular opposition to environmental
degradation).
224. Hanson, supra note 223.
225. Id.
226. Lisa R. Pruitt & Linda T. Sobczynski, Protecting People, Protecting Places: What
Environmental Litigation Conceals and Reveals About Rurality, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 326, 326 (2016).
227. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation, supra note 18, at 145.
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conservationists on public lands.228
Compared with the fossil fuel industry, then, the modern environmental
movement has two problems: (1) a power problem and (2) a branding
problem. Pursuing more aggressive, concerted appeals to labor interests
could help address both of these problems.
The power problem is evidenced in the modern environmental
movement’s inability to penetrate the thick web of interest groups that
benefit from impeding climate reform and other environmental measures.229
The political process is indeed “dominated by the rent-seeking activities of
special-interest groups.”230 Naturally, coalitions and alliances stand to fare
better than interest groups that work alone. While outreach to the fossil fuel
industry may involve mere tilting at windmills given the industry’s track
record, 231 labor and environments’ overlapping interests may have more
potential to give climate advocates more allies and leverage.
But further, joining forces with workers’ advocates could also help the
environmental movement win more hearts and minds. As an example of why
the branding of environmental reform matters, many conservatives said in
one public opinion poll that they opposed the Obama administration’s Clean
Power Plan because they thought it would cost people jobs. 232 If the
environmental movement addressed the jobs concern directly and in
coordination with labor advocates—which they could do by lobbying for
reform through the lens of the just transition—they could proactively address
one of the arguments against environmental reform.
A potential concern in addressing work and labor more directly in
environmental advocacy is that such efforts could result in sustaining
livelihoods in hazardous industries and delaying much-needed
environmental action. However, as discussed below, it is not necessarily
contemplated that just transitions law and policy must entail actually
sustaining hazardous industries; the more important principle is instead
attempting to offset or mitigate some of the losses to livelihoods and
communities as those industries’ activities are curtailed. Further, even if
some compromises were to be made, it is worth considering whether the
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 202, at 60.
Id.
Cf. KATHY MULVEY ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE
ACCOUNTABILITY SCORECARD: RANKING MAJOR FOSSIL FUEL COMPANIES ON CLIMATE DECEPTION,
DISCLOSURE, AND ACTION (2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/10/climateaccountability-scorecard-full-report.pdf.
232. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation, supra note 18, at 173.

2019]

JUST TRANSITIONS

313

movement risks letting the perfect be the enemy of the good, and whether
compromise outcomes may still be preferable to substantively preferable
outcomes indefinitely delayed by political obstacles.233
III. JUST TRANSITIONS AS LAW: FILLING IN THE CONTOURS
This Part asks what are perhaps the most challenging questions
surrounding the prospect of embracing just transitions in law and policy:
What, exactly, does a just transition look like? Who deserves a just
transition? What are the avenues for achieving it?
A helpful starting point is the fact that the pursuit of just transitions is
not entirely alien to United States law and policy. This Part therefore starts
in Section III.A with a brief summary and critique of four of the most
prominent instances when federal institutions have authorized transitional
policy to address worker and community displacement: (1) the Trade Act of
1974 providing assistance to manufacturing workers displaced by reduced
restrictions on trade; (2) the President’s Northwest Forest Plan providing
assistance to timber communities displaced by reductions in timbering on
public lands; (3) the Tobacco Transition Payment Program assisting tobacco
farmers displaced by public litigation against tobacco companies in the
1990s; and (4) the Obama administration’s Partnerships for Opportunity and
Workforce and Economic Revitalization (“POWER”) Initiative assisting
coalfield communities in the face of coal’s decline.
Interestingly, only two of the programs—the Forest Plan and
POWER—have an explicit environmental component. This suggests that in
practice, the understanding of just transitions has not been simply as a
corollary to environmental progress. Rather, the consistent conditions among
these scenarios are (1) a dependency relationship between a community and
an industry that is (2) undermined by some public action, or perhaps in the
case of coal, public inaction. Section III.B therefore also explores other, nonenvironmental scenarios where just transitions may be warranted, such as the
example of New York City taxi drivers being displaced by ride-sharing
services, or of longstanding community residents facing displacement by
gentrification. Section III.B also revisits the argument that the line between
economic and legal transitions is often blurrier than some might suggest,
indicating that a scenario should not necessarily require a clear act of direct
public complicity in order to trigger a just transition.
Section III.C discusses instances of locally-driven approaches to just
233. See generally Hari Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695
(2016) (discussing how environmental reform may be possible by tempering partisanship).
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transitions and posits that these examples offer important insights alongside
the federal programs, particularly since the federal programs have, as a
whole, not been considered particularly successful (while the effects of the
POWER Initiative remain to be seen as of this writing). Local land use
planning processes and similar mechanisms help account for the complex,
interconnecting factors that shape mono-economies’ dependency
relationships. They thus may have benefits to offer as an alternative or
complement to the standard practice of using federal agencies to implement
transitional policy.
Finally, Section III.D offers additional thoughts as to how and when
just transitions should be pursued and who should pay for them. Yet this
discussion again raises the question of whether transitional policy is the
answer for worker and community vulnerability in the face of climate change
or in other contexts, or whether more robust baseline protections may be the
simpler, more efficient approach. This latter approach may also be the fairer,
more inclusive one, in that transitional policy directs resources to workers
who are losing “good jobs,” while other workers, particularly
disproportionate numbers of women and people of color in the service
industry, have benefited inequitably from such jobs in the first place.
A. FEDERAL TRANSITIONAL POLICIES
1. The Trade Act of 1974
The Trade Act of 1962 established the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program (“TAA”), while the Trade Act of 1974 gave birth to the modern
program still operational today.234 The program has become a quid pro quo
component of modern trade policy. That is, in order to open more trade
avenues, more trade assistance for injured domestic workers is often a
necessary political compensatory measure.235
Crafted in the name of fairness, the program’s goal is to provide aid to
workers who lose their jobs, hours of work, or wages because of increases in
imports. 236 Congress was “of the view that fairness demanded some
mechanism whereby the national public, which realizes an overall gain
234. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 617.2 (2018).
235. See, e.g., Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers, EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN.,
https://doleta.gov/tradeact (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
236. 19 U.S.C.. § 2251(a) (2012); Rogers, supra note 184 (“While the program initially provided
aid only to workers, businesses, and communities, it was expanded in 2002 to cover farmers and
fishermen through the Agricultural Trade Adjustment Assistance program.”); see also Stephen Kim
Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 797, 817–39 (2012) (discussing rationales for trade adjustment assistance).
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through trade readjustments, can compensate the particular . . . workers who
suffer a loss . . . .”237 Returning to the idea that certain forms of displacement
are ethically similar to takings, even if not cognizable as such in law, a
federal court observed that TAA was pursued in as “much as the doctrine of
eminent domain requires compensation when private property is taken for
public use. Otherwise the costs of a federal policy [of free trade] that
conferred benefits on the nation as a whole would be imposed on a minority
of American workers . . . .”238
Individuals eligible under the program may file a petition to the U.S.
Department of Labor within one year of losing work. 239 Once certified,
workers are then eligible to apply for TAA program benefits, which are
administered through state agencies.240 The benefits include “weekly cash
benefits, job retraining, and allowances for job searches or relocation.”241
“According to [2011] White House statistics, the average worker receiving
benefits is a 46 year-old male with a high school education who is the
primary breadwinner for his family and has worked for at least ten years at a
factory that is closing.”242
Since the program’s inception, however, studies have shown that trade
adjustment benefits have simply not gone far enough to compensate
displaced workers for their losses. In one survey of displaced shoe workers
in the 1970s, researchers concluded that
even if benefits were granted to a larger number of workers, each
individual would be compensated for only a very small portion of his
actual loss. The actual payments have been characterized by organized
labor as band-aid treatment, because the subsequent wage loss as well as
the many nonmonetary losses from displacement are not directly
addressed.243

More recently, economist Lori Kletzer found that almost forty percent
Int’l Union, UAW v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 2271 (2012); Petition Filing Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR (Aug. 31, 2018), https://doleta.gov/tradeact/petitioners/FAQ_Answers.cfm#G4.
240. Investing in Trade-Affected Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://doleta.gov/tradeact/petitioners/petitionprocess.cfm; see also BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONG. RES.
SERV. TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS AND THE TAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2015
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44153.pdf (“Individual benefits are funded by the federal
government and administered by state agencies through their workforce systems and unemployment
insurance systems.”).
241. Rogers, supra note 184, at 568.
242. Id. at 568–69.
243. Malcolm Bale & John Mutti, Income Losses, Compensation, and International Trade, 13 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 278, 283–84 (1978).
237.
238.
239.
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of displaced workers did not find new jobs within one to two years after a
job loss resulting from increased competition. 244 Another economist
described trade assistance programs as “a collection of ad hoc, out-of-date,
and inadequate programs that provide too little assistance too late to those in
need.” 245 Legal scholars—who tend to treat TAA as a component of
international trade law—have also critiqued trade adjustment assistance
programs. Some deem TAA “a grave failure,” for reasons including “failures
at the administrative and state levels, to Federal incompetence, to lack of
resources and outreach for displaced workers,” as well as the inadequacy of
judicial review available for workers unfairly denied assistance.246 Its flaws
notwithstanding, many agree that the program is preferable to not offering
assistance at all and that reforms may stand to improve it.247
2. The President’s Northwest Forest Plan
The President’s Northwest Forest Plan (“NWFP”) was formed in the
aftermath of a 1992 decision in which the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington imposed an injunction prohibiting over 66,000 acres
of timber from being harvested on Washington public lands because of
dangers the harvesting posed to the northern spotted owl. 248 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this and a series of related decisions.249 The
Clinton administration then developed the NWFP, aimed toward enhancing
conservation in the region. In 1994, the Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management adopted the NWFP.250
The circumstances surrounding the NWFP’s enactment were famously
contentious.251 This scenario is at times considered a classic case study of
244. See LORI G. KLETZER, JOB LOSS FROM IMPORTS: MEASURING THE COSTS 78 (2001).
245. Designing a National Strategy for Responding to Economic Dislocation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 1
(2008) (testimony of Howard Rosen, Executive Director, Trade Adjustment Assistance Coalition).
246. Shana Fried, Note, Strengthening the Role of the U.S. Court of International Trade in Helping
Trade-Affected Workers, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 747, 748 (2006); see also Steven T. O’Hara, Worker
Adjustment Assistance: The Failure & The Future, 5 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 394, 395–96 (1983).
247. See Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s Eroding
Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1881 (1993); see also Park, supra note 236 passim; Fried, supra note
246 passim.
248. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Mosley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1490 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (stating that
endangering the northern spotted owl violated the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600).
249. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1510 (D. Or. 1992), aff’d sub
nom. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993).
250. See Am. Forest Res. Council v. Shea, 172 F. Supp. 2d 24, (D.D.C. 2001); Michael C. Blumm
& Tim Wigington, The Oregon & California Railroad Grant Land’s Sordid Past, Contentious Present,
and Uncertain Future: A Century of Conflict, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013); Robert B.
Keiter, Toward a National Conservation Network Act: Transforming Landscape Conservation on the
Public Lands into Law, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 62, 122 (2018).
251. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
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“jobs versus environment.” Timber harvesters were outraged based on the
perception that the habitat of a single species should wield such an impact
on their livelihoods. Predictions of “economic devastation” followed the
court decisions, with fears of “a new ‘Appalachia in the Northwest.’” 252
Environmentalists, meanwhile, saw the decisions as a necessary
conservation win.
The economic concerns were not fictional. According to one
commentator, “[n]o economic analysis [could] ignore the suffering of some
rural communities, which [bore] the brunt of the economic pain associated
with reduced federally subsidized timber supplies.”253 When the injunction
issued, it threw “between 60,000 and 100,000 people out of work.”254 The
NWFP sought to address some of this pain:
[It] extend[ed] assistance to workers and communities, payments to
counties to compensate for reduced income, removal of tax incentives for
the export of raw logs, and assistance to encourage growth and investment
of small businesses and secondary manufacturing. Similarly, the
Economic Adjustment Initiative . . . provided over $550 million to aid
communities and individuals affected by reduced timber harvests. 255

The NWFP also illustrates the causal complexity of factors that
influence regional decline. Because of automation, “many jobs in the
federally subsidized timber industry were on their way out long before the
owl was listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act.” 256
Generally, “rural areas dependent on the federal land-based timber industry”
were not faring as well as other regions as of the 1990s. 257 Nonetheless,
federal actors saw fit to intervene in this scenario involving mixed
technological, economic, and legal factors contributing to the decline.258
(rejecting a challenge to the scope of the federal government’s discretion in adopting the legislation);
Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 165, 245–48 (2006).
252. Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55, at 577.
253. Id. at 582.
254. Paul Koberstein, Will the Northwest Forest Plan Come Undone?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr.
7, 2015), https://www.hcn.org/articles/will-the-northwest-forest-plan-come-undone.
255. Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55, at 582. Charnley, supra note 136, at 286–87 (noting that the
program met with mixed successes but suggesting that certain changes could have made it more
successful); Michelle W. Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in
Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465, 503 (2014) (noting that NWFP’s job development programs,
focused on common phenomenon of overlap between areas with economic hardship and areas with atrisk species, indicate that economic development should be cornerstone of environmental activism).
256. Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55, at 577.
257. Id. at 582.
258. Carey Catherine Whitehead, Wielding a Finely Crafted Legal Scalpel: Why Courts Did Not
Cause the Decline of the Pacific Northwest Timber Industry, 38 ENVTL. L. 979, 1012 (2008) (discussing
intermingled factors contributing to decline of regional timber industry, and economists’ struggle to
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The NWFP “never truly satisfied the warring factions, the timber
industry and the environmentalists.” 259 However, it was considered an
achievement for the Clinton administration.260 Much analysis of the NWFP’s
implementation has focused on its ecological successes. Yet, in all, “the
NWFP has been more successful in stopping actions thought to be harmful
to conservation . . . than it has been in promoting active restoration and
adaptive management and in implementing economic and social policies set
out under the plan.”261
The NWFP provided for “payments to timber-dependent counties
suffering from cutbacks” due to the law’s implementation in 2000.262 Since
the NWFP’s implementation, counties formerly dependent on timber
harvests for tax revenues have received millions of dollars.263 Today, many
of these counties are considered to be “in crisis” because of curtailments in
direct federal subsidies.264 The NWFP was criticized as failing to “provide
long-term economic growth and security” for former timber counties.265
3. The Tobacco Transition Payment Program
The tobacco industry has several unique quirks, but the parallels
between the tobacco industry and the fossil fuel industry are notable. Both
industries have invested aggressively in science-denial and public relations
initiatives, both have rendered entire communities dependent upon them, and
both have seen major shifts in public awareness contribute to their decline.266
In addition to increased anti-tobacco sentiment and knowledge of health
risks among the public, a mass tort action against tobacco companies in the
1990s brought them to the brink of extinction—which perhaps signifies a
parallel to ongoing climate-related litigation against fossil fuel companies.267
Because of the economic hardships associated with decreased tobacco
separate effects of injunctions and general recession on regional timber industry).
259. Koberstein, supra note 254.
260. Id.
261. Jack Ward Thomas et al., The Northwest Forest Plan: Origins, Components, Implementation
Experience, and Suggestions for Change, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 277, 283 (2006); see also Ted
Helvoigt et al., Employment Transitions in Oregon’s Wood Products Sector During the 1990s, 101 J.
FORESTRY 42, 42–46 (2003).
262. Michael C. Blumm & Tim Wigington, The Past as Prologue to the Present Managing the
Oregon and California Forest Lands, OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2013, at 24, 25.
263. Id. at 27.
264. Anderson, supra note 255, at 470.
265. Blumm & Wiginton, supra note 262, at 29.
266. Craig P. Raysor, From the Sword to the Pen: A History and Current Analysis of U.S. Tobacco
Marketing Regulations, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 497, 512, 525 (2008) (noting inter alia problem of nondiversification of tobacco farms in early twentieth century).
267. See id. See generally Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018).
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demand and government pushback against the tobacco industry, in the late
1990s, a settlement between states and large tobacco companies provided for
billions of dollars of economic assistance to be paid to tobacco farmers.268
The ten-year Tobacco Transition Payment Program (“TTPP”) was created to
“ease tobacco farmers’ worries” and give them “time to diversify their crop
to include other commodities separate from tobacco, or to allow
[them] . . . to cease planting tobacco altogether.” 269 The TTPP also
terminated a federal price-fixing program that had supported tobacco farmers
since the 1930s.270
The TTPP is often referred to as a “buy-out” program.271 However, the
term is somewhat misleading because farmers were not necessarily paid to
stop growing tobacco.272 Tobacco producers received government assistance
by signing up for the TTPP through the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Commodity Credit Corporation, which “provide[d] payments to tobacco
quota holders who voluntarily enter[ed] into appropriate contracts with the
government”273—including for the cessation of tobacco production.274 The
TTPP provided eligible producers with ten equal annual payments “designed
to transition tobacco producers into a free market for their produce.”275
The program’s effects were mixed and may be the subject of debate.
The number of tobacco farmers was reduced dramatically just after
deregulation was implemented. 276 Each participating farmer received on
average a total of approximately $17,000 over the course of the program,
while 75% of payments went to the top ten percent of farms.277 Some have
268. 7 C.F.R. § 1463.1 (2018); Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Forfeiting Federalism: The Faustian Pact
with Big Tobacco, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 291, 308 (2015).
269. Dreveskracht, supra note 268, at 308; see also Tobacco Transition Payment Program:
Examination Treatment of Assets Related to the Tobacco Transition Payment Program, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP. (Aug. 3, 2005), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil7305.html.
270. Tobacco Transition Payment Program, supra note 269; see also Fair and Equitable Tobacco
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1521 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 518 (2012)); JOSEPH C.
ROBERT, THE STORY OF TOBACCO IN AMERICA 210 (1949).
271. See, e.g., Tobacco Transition Payment Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=toba&topic=landing (last updated Jan. 30,
2013).
272. See generally Helen Pushkarskaya & Maria I Marshall, Lump Sum Versus Annuity: Choices of
Kentucky Farmers During the Tobacco Buyout Program, 41 J. AGRIC. AND APPLIED ECON. 613, 614
(2009).
273. 5 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. Income Support Programs—Tobacco § 5510, Westlaw
(database updated July 2018) [hereinafter Income Support Programs—Tobacco].
274. 7 U.S.C. § 518b (2012).
275. Income Support Programs—Tobacco, supra note 273.
276. Nathan Bomey, Thousands of Farmers Stopped Growing Tobacco After Deregulation Payouts,
USA TODAY (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/09/02/thousands-farmersstopped-growing-tobacco-after-deregulation-payouts/32115163.
277. Id.
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suggested that these payments offered important “injections of cash” for
struggling rural communities.278 On the other hand, the program may have
had the effect of shackling some farmers to their crops involuntarily, as many
were “unable to break free of the cycle of debt” associated with restructured
relationships. 279 Some farmers, in response to the program, actually
expanded their production of tobacco.280
The TTPP model may have some lessons to offer just transitions law
and policy. The fact that the TTPP helped transition workers and
communities away from a production activity that had been publicly
subsidized for decades, with minimal public attention or controversy, seems
like a success. At the very least, the TTPP recognized that the political
majority was complicit in fostering farmers’ dependency on the hazardous
activity through national legislative intervention since the 1930s, and
complicit in undermining that dependency relationship.
On the other hand, the TTPP model’s slow-sunsetting approach may
stand in direct tension with the urgency associated with decarbonization. It
also seemed to rely somewhat on tobacco farmers’ capacity for autonomous
decisionmaking over their own production activities, which may not apply
to many other scenarios or address regional economic dependencies with
necessary robustness.
4. The POWER Initiative
In 2016, the Obama administration announced a nearly forty million
dollar program for twenty economic and workforce development projects to
assist communities affected by changes in the coal and power industry.281
The POWER Initiative was a joint effort involving ten federal agencies with
the goal of either creating or retaining several thousand jobs, in addition to
broader economic development, such as economic diversification, attracting
new sources of investment, and providing workforce services and skills
training. Through the POWER Initiative, the Appalachian Regional
Commission (“ARC”) and other agencies have received over $100 million
in appropriations to assist displaced coal workers.282
278. Id.
279. Dreveskracht, supra note 268, at 312.
280. Blake Brown, The End of the Tobacco Transition Payment Program, N.C. ST. UNIV. (Nov. 14,
2013), https://tobacco.ces.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/The-End-of-the-Tobacco-TransitionPayment-Program.pdf?fwd=no.
281. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Administration Announces New
Economic and Workforce Development Resources for Coal Communities Through POWER Initiative
(Aug. 24, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/24/fact-sheetadministration-announces-new-economic-and-workforce.
282. POWER Initiative, APPALACHIAN REGIONAL. COMMISSION (last visited Feb. 5, 2019),
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For instance, the ARC alone has received $50 million from Congress
since 2016 in order to:
target federal resources to help communities and regions that have been
affected by job losses in coal mining, coal power plant operations, and
coal-related supply chain industries due to the changing economics of
America’s energy production. To date, ARC has invested $94 million in
projects serving 250 coal impacted counties. These projects are expected
to create or retain 8,800 jobs, train 25,400 workers or students, and
leverage an additional $210 million to the Region. 283

ARC receives applications for funding from local governments, states,
other political subdivisions, non-profit organizations, and institutions of
higher education.284 As of this writing, little commentary has assessed the
program’s outcomes. The proposed POWER Plus Plan, meanwhile, focused
on more direct assistance to workers; yet it and similar proposals have failed
to make their way through Congress.285
B. SYNTHESIZING FEDERAL TRANSITIONAL POLICIES
Several themes emerge from the programs above. These themes
illuminate the conditions that have been considered appropriate for
triggering intervention in pursuit of a just transition. These programs’
strengths and weaknesses in design and implementation can also inform
future efforts.
The first theme is that policymakers have implemented transitional
policy when there is foreseeable, widespread displacement to workers as the
result of some form of public action. Embedded in the foreseeable
displacement is the existence of some kind of dependency relationship or
longstanding regional mono-economy. This theme may explain why
transitional support beyond unemployment benefits is not specifically
provided when a sector like Blockbuster goes out of business: unlike with
https://www.arc.gov/funding/power.asp; ARC Seeks Funds for Coal-Impacted Communities, FAYETTE
TRIB. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.fayettetribune.com/news/arc-seeks-funds-for-coal-impactedcommunities/article_cbae624e-09dc-11e8-896a-1f98f0f3a842.html.
283. APPALACHIAN REG’L. COMM’N, FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 5 (2018),
https://www.arc.gov/images/newsroom/publications/fy2019budget/FY2019PerformanceBudgetFeb201
8.pdf.
284. POWER Initiative, supra note 282; see also APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, POWER
AWARDS,
OCTOBER
2018,
https://www.arc.gov/images/grantsandfunding/POWER2018
/ARCEconDiversificationAwardsSummaries10-11-2018.pdf.
285. Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1550–55 (2018)
(discussing both failed and implemented congressional and executive efforts to assist coal communities
and workers, including the POWER Initiative (implemented), POWER Plus (failed), the Abandoned
Mine Land Economic Revitalization (“AMLER”) Program (failed), and the Revitalizing the Economy of
Coal Communities by Leveraging Local Activities and Investing More (“RECLAIM”) Act (failed)).
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each of the sectors above, there are no company towns or regions where
substantial portions of the population have been employed at Blockbuster for
decades.
Critically, though, the programs do not require some sort of showing
that a loss is the proximate result of an intentional public act. In fact, the
Trade Act of 1974 specifically undid such a requirement imposed by the
1962 Act. The 1962 Act required that increased imports were the “major
cause” of beneficiaries’ unemployment. 286 Yet it became clear shortly
thereafter that most workers simply would not be able to meet such a
burden. 287 One reason for the absence of a causality requirement is that
economic and legal transitions in the United States are fundamentally
entangled. Further, the absence of regulations may affect transitions in
similar ways as the creation of regulations. As discussed above,
commentators often point to the cheapness of natural gas as the “real” reason
for the coal industry’s decline; yet Congress could easily have chosen to
regulate natural gas more stringently or otherwise intervene into energy
markets.
One weakness, at least with the NWFP and TAA, is that neither is
considered to have achieved successful economic mitigation in the face of
the loss being addressed. One reason for this may be that directing large aid
packages to benefits such as relocation assistance will inevitably be a “bandaid” approach if those packages do not address the root cause of workers’
and communities’ vulnerability. The root cause is the development of the
dependency relationship or mono-economy in the first place. In this sense, it
is possible that federal actors—unless they create a New Deal-style form of
transitional employment themselves—may be too detached from regional
realities to meaningfully reshape a region. Similarly, the very nature of these
programs may reflect a “too little, too late” approach to addressing
longstanding histories of regional under-investment. The TTPP may have
been more successful in part because many tobacco farmers were near
retirement anyway, few depended solely on tobacco-farming income, and
tobacco farmers may have been better able to exercise control over their own
economic activities as compared to laid-off manufacturing or timber
workers.288
The second problem with these programs is that as jobs like timbering
286. Malcom Bale & John Mutti, Income Losses, Compensation, and International Trade, 13 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 278, 280 (1978).
287. Id.
288. Brown, supra note 280.
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and mining decline, no comparably lucrative, low-skill jobs are, in fact,
available as alternatives for displaced workers. The three main traditional
rural livelihoods—natural resource extraction, manufacturing, and
farming—have declined dramatically.289 The sectors that have taken their
place are lower-paying positions in the service industry.290 These positions
lack the security, culture, and regional influence of the traditional
livelihoods. Transitional policy geared toward moving a worker from a
traditional livelihood to a modern one will almost inevitably be moving that
worker a step down in the world of work. In turn, the region may be fated to
suffer, as each individual experiences a loss in wages and security,
effectuating ripple effects on local tax coffers.
The POWER Initiative does align with this Article’s theoretical
discussion of how a just transition should be defined. The program’s focus
on diverse forms of regional stakeholders and initiatives may make it better
poised to succeed than programs focused more heavily on one approach,
such as worker retraining or providing direct subsidies to local governments.
Yet it is not clear that POWER is adequate to address the likely-intensified
losses anticipated to be associated with deep decarbonization.
In any case, these programs indicate that circumstances triggering just
transitions are not limited to what is arguably the perfect case study of the
coalfield community. The case of the New York City taxi drivers illustrates
yet another scenario where workers formed a longstanding dependency
relationship with one industry; their industry performed a quasi-public
function; and the public’s failure to act left the workers vulnerable to an
abrupt collapse of their industry, leaving them without meaningful
alternatives. As with manufacturing or mining jobs, taxi drivers, once part of
a lucrative, regulated community, were suddenly in competition with options
that were cheaper, faster, and less secure in the form of app-directed ridesharing services.291 Many drivers had invested their life savings in coveted
taxi medallions, the value of which dropped dramatically due to the rise of
Uber and Lyft. Six driver suicides over the course of six months in 2018
brought the City’s attention to this community’s struggle. 292 As of this
289. See Council of Econ. Advisers, Strengthening the Rural Economy—The Current State of Rural
America, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Apr. 27, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/administration/eop/cea/factsheets-reports/strengthening-the-rural-economy/the-currentstate-of-rural-america.
290. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Current Employment Statistics Survey: 100 Years of Employment,
Hours, and Earnings, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Aug. 2016), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2016.38.
291. See Reihan Salam, Taxi-Driver Suicides Are a Warning, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/taxi-driver-suicides-are-a-warning/561926.
292. Phil McCausland, Sixth New York City Cab Driver Dies of Suicide After Struggling
Financially, NBC NEWS (June 16, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sixth-new-york-city-
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writing, “New York’s city council is poised to approve a one-year cap on
new licenses for Uber . . . and other ride-sharing vehicles as part of a
sweeping package of regulations intended to reduce traffic and halt the
downward slide in drivers’ pay.”293
Just transitions considerations also seem relevant to communities
displaced by gentrification. In those instances, the community has developed
a dependency relationship on an existing way of life. This way of life could
have relied, in fact, on a history of under-investment, the absence of industry,
or a mix of industries that are not necessarily lucrative. When more lucrative
industries arrive to take advantage of that history of under-investment—
bringing with them wealthier residents and higher home and goods prices—
political inaction in the face of the communities’ vulnerability to
displacement may be an analogous version of an unjust transition.294
The next Section looks at alternatives, or potential complements, to
federal aid packages in transitional programs. It posits that locally-driven
transitions may stand to more meaningfully untangle the diverse issues at
play in a mono-economy or dependency relationship. This more intimate
process could in turn wield more benefits in shaping regional economic fates.
C. LOCALLY-DRIVEN TRANSITIONS
Alan Ramo and Deborah Behles examined the experience of Navajo
and Hopi communities with the Mohave Generating Station along the
Nevada-Arizona border in the late 1990s and early 2000s.295 Their case study
provides an illustration of a scenario in which local actors addressed the
impending cessation of hazardous industrial activity that a community also
depended upon economically.
The U.S. Department of the Interior decided in the early nineteenth
century that the Mohave Station would receive its coal and water from
nearby Hopi and Navajo reservations. 296 This decision commenced a
longstanding exploitative relationship that gave Native groups little control
cab-driver-dies-suicide-after-struggling-n883886; Nikita Stewart & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Another Taxi
Driver in Debt Takes His Life. That’s 5 in 5 Months., N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/nyregion/taxi-driver-suicide-nyc.html.
293. Henry Goldman, Hyperdrive: NYC Is Set to Impose a Cap on Uber, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-06/nyc-set-to-impose-cap-on-uber-as-ridehail-vehicles-clog-streets.
294. See Just Transition: A Framework for Change, CLIMATE JUST. ALLIANCE,
https://climatejusticealliance.org/just-transition (Last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (listing gentrification as
scenario warranting just transition considerations).
295. See Ramo & Behles, supra note 84, at 509.
296. Id. at 509–10.
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over their coal and water resources. 297 For years, both Hopi and Navajo
tribes advocated to set aside the original decree, protesting highly
undervalued royalties they received for use of their coal and water.298 Yet
the communities also depended on the royalties, as well as the fact that about
250 Navajo were employed at Mohave’s mine.299
In 1998, two environmental groups sued Mohave’s owners, alleging
violations of Clean Air Act emissions limits, compliance orders, and
reporting requirements; simultaneously, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency concluded that the plant posed a risk to visibility in the Grand
Canyon. 300 Thus began the transition toward the closure of the Mohave
Plant, which risked leaving the native communities in even worse
circumstances than before, despite the closure’s likely environmental
benefits.
The Mohave plant was closed in 2006.301 It was not closed because of
environmental hazards, but because it was no longer cost-effective—which
again raises the question of untangling the causal factors that trigger the need
for a just transition. The communities were “devastated by Mohave’s
operation,” but also devastated by its closure.302
Issues concerning the plant arose in another proceeding around the
same time, however, where Mohave’s former owner, Southern California
Edison, was involved in a rate case with the California Public Utilities
Commission (“CPUC”).303 Local groups formed an organization called the
“Just Transition Coalition” in order to intervene in the proceeding. The
coalition was an “alliance of environmental and grassroots Native American
interests including the Indigenous Environmental Network, Black Mesa
Trust, Black Mesa Water coalition, To’ Nizhoni Ani, Grand Canyon Trust,
and the Sierra Club.”304 The coalition intervened “to demand that the CPUC
allocate funds from the sale of Acid Rain SO2 allowances, which were an
unneeded windfall if Mohave remained closed, to help transition the Hopi
and Navajo communities to cleaner energy alternatives.” 305 The group
emphasized that a transition that invested in the communities “was equitable
due to Mohave’s operation and closure’s devastating economic and social
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 510.
Id. at 512–13.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 519.
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impacts and decades of . . . subsidized cheap coal power.” 306 The CPUC
then ordered Mohave’s former owner to set aside acid rain allowances to be
disbursed in the future.307
The process of transitioning the communities away from their
dependency relationship with the plant involved “years of mediation,
workshops, and litigation,” which resulted in the Hopi and Navajo agreeing
with the Just Transition Coalition that revenues should be used to incentivize
renewable energy generation. 308 The CPUC, relying on its authority to
“exercise equitable jurisdiction as an incident to its express duties” to
regulate utilities in its jurisdiction, as well as California’s Renewable
Portfolio Standard, decided “to disburse the allowance revenues to
incentivize renewable generation that benefited Hopi and Navajo
communities.”309
While the procedural evolution of this case study may appear to be a
unique or idiosyncratic approach to a just transition, it offers lessons for
pursuing just transitions elsewhere. Ramo and Behles argued that this
scenario “presents a roadmap for other states to consider creative solutions
to help communities transition away from fossil-fuel generation.”310 As of
this writing, many commentators seem to view the Mohave transition as a
success story.311
The Mohave process in fact mirrors several procedural models that can
be embodied in law and policy in different ways. First, it resembles new
governance. According to new governance theory, diverse stakeholders must
be involved in decisionmaking, where traditional networks and hierarchies
are emphasized less, and the exchange of information and pursuit of win-win
solutions are emphasized more.312 More traditionally, though, this process
resembles land use planning processes, which also involve bringing
stakeholders together to pursue collaborative decisionmaking. 313
Administrative law and policy can provide for mechanisms that facilitate
communities’ ability to pursue these processes.
Diverse local and state jurisdictions in the United States and
306. Id. at 521.
307. Id. at 525–26.
308. See id. at 522.
309. Id. at 523–25.
310. Id. at 526.
311. See, e.g., J. Mijin Cha, Labor Leading on Climate: A Policy Platform to Addressing Rising
Inequality and Rising Sea Levels in New York State, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 447 (2017) (citing
Mohave example as positive outcome).
312. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation, supra note 18, at 138.
313. Id.
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internationally are in the process of approaching transitions in different
ways. In 2008, the State of Kentucky passed a tax incentive to attract new
employers to the region.314 The struggling coal town of Hazard, Kentucky,
has developed a former surface mine site into a research and testing facility
for drone companies, while also offering new skills courses through the local
community college.315 The Canadian province of Alberta has earmarked $40
million to help approximately 2,000 workers, who are “losing their jobs as
the province transitions away from thermal coal mines and coal-fired power
plants over the next decade,” by providing “tuition vouchers, retraining
programs, and on-site transitioning advice.” 316 These varying approaches
indicate that the ideal model for pursuing a just transition may be contextspecific. At least, as much of the global community seeks to transition to
low-carbon energy emissions in the coming years, more success stories and
replicable models should emerge.
The Mohave study suggests that certain conditions may be conducive
to a more transformative transition than an approach focused more narrowly
on a measure such as worker retraining. These conditions include equal
bargaining power among stakeholders, stakeholders with adequate
resources, and a procedural mechanism to pursue a long-term
decisionmaking or dispute resolution process. An effort toward transition
that is more transformative also must involve some iterative
decisionmaking—the “messiness” often associated with successful
stakeholder collaboration—rather than single instances of legislative reform.
Appropriate venues could be state, local, or federal administrative agencies,
local governments, and courts.
The Mohave study also shows how a just transitions policy can, and
often should, be pursued in tandem with remedies for a history of
environmental injustice. Many communities that depend upon high-carbon
industries have also been harmed by them; many communities harmed by
high-carbon industries have not benefited economically at all. Yet the choice
of remedy does not pose an “either/or” choice between remedying
314. See generally KY. CTR. FOR ECON. DEV., JUST THE FACTS: KENTUCKY BUSINESS INVESTMENT
PROGRAM (2018), http://thinkkentucky.com/kyedc/pdfs/KBIFactSheet.pdf?57.
315. Parija Kavilanz, How This Kentucky Coal Town Is Trying to Bring its Economy Back to Life,
CNN (Nov. 8, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/08/news/economy/hazard-kentucky-coal-jobs
/index.html.
316. Slav Kornik, Alberta Puts Up $40M to Help Workers Transition During Coal-Power PhaseOut, GLOBAL NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017), https://globalnews.ca/news/3855043/alberta-puts-up-40m-to-helpworkers-transition-during-coal-power-phase-out; see also A Just Transition: The Way Forward for Coal
Communities, ENERGY TRANSITION (Feb. 20, 2017), https://energytransition.org/2017/02/a-justtransition-the-way-forward-for-coal-communities (discussing transitions for coal communities in
Germany).
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environmental injustice or remedying just transitions. A holistic, democratic
process can account for both past harms and future risks.
D. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PURSUING JUST TRANSITIONS
A pressing question in the pursuit of just transitions policy is, who pays
for just transitions? More specifically, why should the public pay and not the
employers who have left these regions and workers vulnerable?
The discussion in this Article is primarily concerned with public options
for facilitating collective transitions. It is presumed that employers will often
not be in a position to facilitate just transitions themselves. First—consistent
with the above-mentioned concerns about interest groups—accountability
for fossil fuel companies has been elusive.317 Congress has virtually declined
to regulate the natural gas industry, for example.318 Second, many employers
have become insolvent, as evidenced by the spate of coal companies that
have filed for bankruptcy in recent years.319
Nonetheless, future research should address the prospect of employer
involvement in just transitions law and policy, especially where employers
have knowingly pursued hazardous industrial activity to society’s detriment.
In addition to tobacco companies’ involvement in funding the TTPP program
described in Section III.A.3, a starting point for this consideration would be
the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (the
“WARN Act”).
The WARN Act “was enacted in 1988 in response to the rash of plant
closings and layoffs that had occurred in the immediately preceding
years.”320 It sought “to enable workers, their families, and local community
leaders sufficient time to prepare for mass layoffs or plant closures.”321 It
“obligates employers to provide at least 60-days notice to employees and
local government officials of a covered plant closure or mass layoff.”322 The
Act covers employers who plan to lay off fifty or more employees during
any thirty-day period, excluding part-time employees.
317. See Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal, Chapter 11, and the
Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 passim (2019); see also Eisenberg, Beyond Science and
Hysteria, supra note 145, at 207.
318. See Macey & Salovaara, supra note 317 passim.
319. See, e.g., Katy Stech Ferek, Coal Company Armstrong Energy Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Protection, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coal-company-armstrong-energyfiles-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection-1509548753.
320. Ethan Lipsig & Keith R. Fentonmiller, A WARN Act Road Map, 11 LAB. LAW. 273, 273 (1996).
321. Nicole C. Snyder & Scott E. Randolph, Understanding the Federal WARN Act and Its Impact
on the Sale of A Business, 52 ADVOCATE 29, 29 (2009).
322. Id.
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The WARN Act has been heavily criticized. Not only does it do little
for workers and communities beyond providing a strikingly brief notice
period before entire communities may be upended, but it also was deemed
“imprecise, vague, difficult to interpret, and . . . may be very difficult to
apply sensibly to particular fact situations.”323 But the idea could be helpful.
Perhaps a modernized WARN Act of just transitions law and policy would
require six to twelve months’ notice and options for assisting workers to
retrain and relocate, for example.
Finally, perhaps the real concern underlying the justice or injustice of
transitions is not about transitions at all. Measures such as guaranteed
employment or universal basic income, for example, would preclude the
need to manufacture new regional or sectoral economies in anticipation of
the ebb and flow of industries. A more robust baseline of worker and
community support would make the vulnerability associated with transitions
less dire and help preclude difficult decisions as to who should win and lose
in the distribution of benefits and burdens.
CONCLUSION
In the context of climate change, legal scholars should embrace the just
transition as an equitable principle of easing the burden decarbonization
poses to workers and communities who depend on carbon-heavy industries.
Embracing this definition will be clarifying, will allow legal scholarship to
engage with other fields and institutions that already recognize this
definition, and will give the labor movement its due for originating the term.
In turn, the concept finds support in important principles relevant to the
environmental condition today, such as the need to account for complex
social-ecological systems, to address jobs-versus-environment tensions, and
to better consider economic equity. In short, if scholars and policymakers
embrace the just transition concept, it stands to serve principles of economic
equity, it might help make climate reform more achievable through coalitionbuilding, and it is poised to bring environmental law more in line with the
needs of the climate era.
Yet the just transition concept bears relevance to diverse scenarios
where workers and communities face large-scale displacement from the
longstanding industries on which they have relied. The moral impetus to help
in the face of displacement may be the strongest where a public initiative is
the clear cause of the displacement. This scenario is the most analogous to
the state’s use of eminent domain, where the “taking” of something is
323.
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compensated because a discrete group is not asked to bear the costs of an
initiative pursued for the greater good. While one might suggest that workers
and communities should bear the costs of such displacement as the natural
price of regulation, U.S. transitional policy illustrates prominent instances
where Congress was compelled to intervene.
The cause of displacement is often unclear, however. Our economic and
legal evolutions tend to be intertwined. Thus, transitional policy may still be
warranted where the cause of the displacement is less clear than the obvious,
and relatively rare, “job-killing” law. Further, even if purely private forces
caused large-scale displacement, considerations of fairness, compassion, and
equity suggest it is the wrong choice to simply leave workers in the lurch
where they lack other alternatives, or where their work contributed a public
or quasi-public function—especially if, as Mazzocchi articulated and as is
the case with fossil fuel workers, that work was particularly hazardous. This
calculus does yield inherent problems with line-drawing. As an alternative,
measures such as universal basic income or other provisions of a more robust
social safety net could preclude the need to pick winners and losers in these
scenarios.
Given federal agencies’ track record of failing to sustainably untangle
regional dependency relationships, to adequately offset workers’ and
communities’ losses, or to nurture forward-looking economic diversification
for regions and sectors in decline, it may be time to question whether federal
agencies are indeed the most appropriate forum for large-scale transitional
policy. It is possible that the largely-untested POWER Initiative uses novel
substantive approaches that may not repeat the mistakes of past policies.
Processes driven by state and local institutions and stakeholders may allow
for a more involved, context-specific approach that can help better address
the challenges associated with historical mono-economies. Additional
research can help illuminate the best mechanisms for achieving just
transitions in practice, especially as the clean-energy transition gains
momentum. Perhaps most importantly, when environmental decisions are
made, just transitions can and should be among values decisionmakers seek
to harmonize.

